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CHAPTER 2.  AN OVERVIEW OF LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS 
 
The fragmented protection of women’s rights in conflict presents analytical, as well as 
doctrinal and institutional, challenges. It is increasingly difficult to fully appreciate 
the role of international law in setting and enforcing rules and providing 
accountability and redress for violations of women’s rights in conflict. The challenge 
is primarily attributable to the concurrent and overlapping operation of International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Criminal Law (ICL), International Human 
Rights Law (IHRL) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This chapter 
sets out to improve analytical clarity, by providing a functional account of how the 
respective regimes differ along key lines, namely their sources in law; the 
underpinning definitions of conflict and women’s rights; and the attendant monitoring 
bodies and enforcement procedures. 
Different sources of law can give rise to uncertainty around who is bound by any 
given legal or normative instrument. Uncertainty may also surround the legal status of 
a particular law or norm,1 in particular whether a hierarchy of norms and obligations 
must be observed.2 While the topic of the making and sources of international law 
                                                 
1 See generally Shelton, D. (2001). Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-
Binding Norms in the International Legal System. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
2 Shelton, D. (2006). Normative Hierarchy in International Law. American Journal of 
International Law, 100(2), 291-323. 
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dominates most introductory works,3 specifically feminist discussion of international 
law sources has been notably sparser.4 To the extent that it has motivated feminist 
analysis, discussion has principally focused on the typically weak and ‘soft law’ basis 
of many of the most progressive articulations of women’s rights, outside of the formal 
sources of law as set-out in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice. The discussion in this chapter reveals how the differing sources of law of 
IHL, ICL, IHRL and the UNSC has been a critical factor in shaping feminist 
engagement and the potential for effective women’s rights protections within each 
regime. 
The terms ‘conflict’ and ‘women’s rights’ imply little conceptual or legal clarity. A 
defining feature of feminist critique of international law and armed conflict is the 
distance between legal definitions of conflict and women’s daily-lived experience. 
However, IHL, ICL, IHRL and the UNSC differ in important ways in their 
underpinning definitions of conflict. No definition is necessarily more or less 
‘woman-friendly’. The significance of the conflict-definition is instead that it 
determines the regime – or regimes – of relevance. Likewise, there is no consensus 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Shaw, M. N. (2003). International Law (6th ed). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 69-126. 
4 But see Charlesworth, H. (2012). Law-making and sources. In J. Crawford & M. 
Koskenniemi (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to International Law (pp. 187-202). 
Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press and Charlesworth, H., & 
Chinkin, C. (2000). The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 62-69. 
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definition of ‘women’s rights’. Indeed, even the language of ‘women’s rights’ might 
be deemed more or less appropriate depending on the regime of focus. The definition 
of women’s rights differ in important ways in their narrowness and breadth, for 
example, in whether emphasis is given to grave physical harm to the female body, or 
to more quotidian matters of women’s access to food and shelter. The chapter 
elucidates these key sites of divergence between the regimes. 
The relevant laws are implemented by separate institutions with widely varying 
powers of monitoring and enforcement, such as the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC), the International Criminal Court (ICC), human rights treaty 
monitoring bodies and the UNSC. Concerns arise around the robustness of the 
attendant monitoring body and enforcement procedure. Who interprets, applies and 
potentially enforces relevant norms and obligations? From an institutional 
perspective, it is far from clear that progressive normative development on women’s 
rights in conflict is accompanied by meaningful accountability. The chapter offers a 
critical overview of the key monitoring bodies and enforcement procedures attendant 
to each regime, in particular in their regulation of women’s rights in conflict.  
The chapter considers, in turn, the sources of law, definitions of conflict and women’s 
rights, monitoring bodies and enforcement procedures. It critically considers the 
strengths and weaknesses of each regime in the regulation of women’s rights in 
conflict. The chapter provides essential context for examining synergies, interactions 
and reinforcements across the regimes in the remainder of the book.  
 
Sources of Law 
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The regimes find their bases in different sources of international law, emerging at 
different times, which in turn imply different constellations of state parties. The 
different temporal development and legal basis of the regimes also has implications 
for regime openness to more progressive feminist interpretation and implementation. 
Although not the subject of significant feminist reflection, this section demonstrates 
that the sources of law of the respective regimes have been important – even 
determinative – in shaping feminist engagement and the potential for effective 
women’s rights protection within each regime. Specifically, because IHL was the first 
to emerge, it now represents the least dynamic regime in terms of its sources. 
Feminist focus has been confined to interpretation and application of IHL, with little 
meaningful prospect to influence law-making. By contrast, the relatively recent and 
highly dynamic emergence of ICL offered considerable scope for feminist influence 
on foundational documents, most notably the Rome Statute. IHRL, uniquely in terms 
of the regimes under study, includes a dedicated treaty for the protection and 
promotion of women’s rights, which has been applied in novel and important ways to 
questions of conflict and has informed the interpretation the broader gamut of 
international human rights treaties. Finally, while the UNSC’s Charter basis offered a 
circumscribed basis for the protection of women’s rights in conflict, changes in the 
broader political environment has prompted the Council to take on a more clearly 
law-making role in the post Cold War era. Interestingly, this has manifested 
prominently in respect of women’s rights and humanitarian concerns in conflict. 
Questions persist, however, as to the appropriateness, legitimacy and legality of the 
UNSC’s growing role in international law-making. This section elucidates these 
dynamics more fully.  
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International Humanitarian Law 
In principle, due to its focus on humanitarianism and civilian protection, IHL suggests 
itself as the regime potentially of most interest to advocates of women’s rights in 
conflict. In practice, however, IHL has attracted, relatively speaking, less feminist 
engagement.5 The sources of IHL have had important implications for the regime’s 
capacity and potential to offer meaningful protection to the lives and rights of women 
in conflict. Its sources have proven exclusionary on two fronts: firstly, the stagnant 
treaty development since 1977 has offered little opportunity for feminist advocacy to 
influence the canon’s foundational texts. Secondly, the reliance on customary 
international law to progressively develop the canon further privileges state practice 
in international law-making, irrespective of the broad exclusion of women from 
leadership and decision-making in most states.6  
IHL is the oldest body of law under consideration,7 inaugurated long before formal 
feminist engagement with international law. Originating with the 1864 Geneva 
                                                 
5 See further  Gardam, J. (2013). A New Frontline for Feminism and International 
Humanitarian Law. In M. Davies & V. E. Munro (Eds.), The Ashgate Research 
Companion to Feminist Legal Theory (pp. 217-232). London & New York: 
Routledge, noting that feminist engagement with IHL has tended to be confined to its 
criminal element.  
6  Charlesworth, H., Chinkin, C., & Wright, S. (1991). Feminist Approaches to 
International Law. American Journal of International Law, 85, 613-645. 
7 See Gallen, J. and Smith, C. (2014). Cáin Adomnáin and the Laws of War. Journal 
of the History of International Law, 16, 1, 63–81, on its roots in Brehon law. 
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Convention and the establishment of the ICRC, it was the horrific experiences of the 
Second World War that precipitated the ever-expanding corpus of modern IHL.8 
Foundational are the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and three Additional Protocols, 
alongside a raft of global conventions prohibiting the use of certain types of weapons, 
such as anti-personnel mines9 and cluster munitions.10 The purpose of IHL is not to 
outlaw the use of armed force, but rather to ensure that any use of force remains 
within certain parameters. 11 It seeks to limit the impact of conflict on those who do 
                                                 
8  Palmieri, D. (2013). An Institution Standing the Test of Time? A Review of 
150 Years of the History of the International Committee of the Red Cross. 
International Review of the Red Cross, 95, 1–26. 
9 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, 18 September 1997, 2056 UNTS 
211. 
10 Convention on Cluster Munitions, 30 May 2008, 2688 UNTS 39. 
11  At its core, IHL is guided by the balancing of four fundamental principles: 
distinction between civilians and combatants; proportionality in attack; precaution in 
attack; and military necessity. These principles stress that the use of force within war 
is not unlimited, and attempt to ensure that combat is conducted in the most humane 
way possible without frustrating the military necessity to achieve an advantage over 
the enemy. The principle of distinction requires belligerents to distinguish between 
civilians and combatants, as well as civilian and military objects, Protocol Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, 
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not participate in hostilities, such as civilians, and those who no longer take part, such 
as wounded combatants or prisoners of war. The International Court of Justice 
considers that for humanitarian law, ‘one of the paramount purposes... is to protect 
civilian life’.12 Combatants are also protected in certain ways, even when taking part 
is hostilities; for example, there are limitations on the types of weapons that can be 
                                                                                                                                            
article 48. Proportionality is twofold. First, it obliges belligerents only to use as much 
force as necessary in attack so as not to cause excessive loss or injury to civilians in 
relation to the military advantage gained, Protocol 1, article 51(5)(b), The principle of 
precaution requires commanders to take constant care in carrying out attacks to spare 
civilians by placing military objects and objectives away from civilian populations 
and objects, to avoid and minimise loss of life to civilians in their use of weapons, and 
to give an effective warning if circumstances permit, Protocol 1, article 57. Military 
necessity is the counter-balance to the three other principles and recognises that 
international law authorises the use of armed and lethal force in certain circumstances. 
However, when an army or armed group engages in the use of force, they are required 
to consider both prevailing military and humanitarian considerations: in other words, 
to balance the expected military advantage to be gained with the direct or collateral 
damage which may occur. 
12 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, General List No. 131, paragraph 162. 
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used against them, bearing in mind that it is not unlawful to kill combatants during 
fighting. 13  
IHL has a strong treaty basis, much of which has now reached the level of customary 
law that is binding on all states irrespective of treaty ratification.14 Contemporary IHL 
is codified in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and supplemented by the Additional 
Protocols I and II of 1977. Each of the treaties noted has a somewhat different focus. 
Geneva Conventions I and II cover wounded and stranded soldiers on land and sea, 
                                                 
13 Dinstein, Y. (2016). The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International 
Armed Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 72–101. Belligerents are 
prohibited from using weapons that will cause ‘superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering’, such as anti-personnel mines or biological weapons, Protocol 1 (n 11), 
article 35(2). 
14 Customary law is defined as a practice which states generally recognize they are 
obliged to perform, or a ‘general practice accepted as law’. Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, 1055 UNTS 993, article 38. To reach the status of 
customary IHL, it must be reflecting in the actual practice of states (four criteria 
inform this determination, namely duration, uniformity, consistency of practice and 
generality of practice), and opinion juris et necesessitates is the requirement that 
nations must engage in the identified uniform and general practice out of a sense of 
legal obligation, as opposed to courtesy, fairness or morality. See also North Sea 
Continental Shelf, 1969 ICJ Reports 3, 41-42; S.S. Lotus Case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 
PCIJ (series A) No. 10 (Sept. 7). On custom as a source of international law, see Shaw 
(n 3), 72-93. 
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respectively, while Geneva III regulates the treatment of prisoners of war, and Geneva 
IV focuses on the lives of civilians in times of war and occupation. The first 
Additional Protocol (1977) supplements the four Geneva Conventions and applies 
also to armed conflict between a State and a national liberation movement. The 
second Additional Protocol (1977) addresses non-international conflicts. Both the 
Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols have been widely ratified. Thus, 
much of Geneva Law, although not yet all of the Additional Protocols I and II, are 
now regarded as reflecting customary law and constitute the main body of IHL.15  
                                                 
15 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories (n 12), paragraph 89. There are still significant states that are not yet 
parties to the two Protocols, in particular the US. The importance of customary law is 
emphasized by the principle in the so-called Martens Clause, first enunciated in the 
Hague Conventions and later in the Geneva Conventions, for example, GC1, article 
63. Protocol 1 (n 11), article 1(2) reaffirmed the application of the principles in cases 
not covered by the Protocol or by other treaties: ‘civilians and combatants remain 
under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from 
established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public 
conscience’. The preamble to Protocol II has a simpler version, Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims 
of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609  
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The question of the customary character of the rules applicable in non-international 
armed conflicts (NIAC) is particularly important for several reasons.16 First, as the 
first instrument entirely dedicated to non-international armed conflicts, Protocol II 
contains twenty-eight articles, which develop and elaborate the law applicable to 
these conflicts. However, contrary to the Geneva Conventions, it has not gained 
universal acceptance. 17  It is therefore important to establish which provisions of 
Protocol II are part of customary international law and thus binding on non-parties.18 
Further, customary rules of international law governing non-international armed 
conflicts are binding on all parties to such conflicts, irrespective of questions of 
applicability of the Protocol for insurgents.19 Finally, as noted, feminist international 
lawyers criticise customary international law as particularly exclusionary to women 
and gender concerns, due to the broad under-representation of women from leadership 
roles in state decision-making.20  
In line with broader developments in the treatment of women’s rights under 
international law, the decades since 1990 have involved feminist recuperative efforts 
in IHL. An important factor regarding the protection of women’s rights under IHL is 
                                                 
16 Meron, T. (1989). Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 72.  
17 As of April 2018, 186 states are party to Protocol II (n 15). 
18 Meron (n 16), 72.  
19 Ibid.  
20 See further Inter-Parliamentary Union. (2018). Women in Parliament in 2017: The 
Year in Review. Geneva: IPU.  
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the widespread consensus that further treaty developments, beyond limitations on 
specific weapons, are no longer possible. This consensus is grounded in concern that 
modern states, given the option, would not choose to limit their belligerent behaviour 
in the ways previously submitted to under Geneva law.21 Proposals for a distinct 
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions addressing women’s rights in conflict, while 
popular for a period,22 quickly abated in the mid-1990s due to recognition of the 
potential vulnerability of the foundational IHL treaties and their largely customary 
status. Thus, unlike the other regimes of relevance, IHL has offered little prospect to 
women’s rights advocates of progressive new law-making.23  
Alternative ideas for enhanced protection of women’s rights under IHL have largely 
focused on exploiting interactions between the regimes. Such proposals included the 
                                                 
21 See, for example, Gardam, J., & Jarvis, M. (2000). Women and Armed Conflict: 
The International Response to the Beijing Platform for Action. Columbia Human 
Rights Law Review, 32, 1-65, 57. 
22 See, for example, Gardam, J. (1997). Women and the Law of Armed Conflict: why 
the silence? International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 46, 55; Gardam, J. 
(2005). The Neglected Aspect of Women and Armed Conflict - Progressive 
Development of the Law. Netherlands International Law Review, 197-219. 
23  The highly specific nature of Protocol III, which involved the imposition of 
effectively no new obligations on state parties, does not constitute a departure from 
the stagnant treaty development in IHL, Protocol additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional 
Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III), 8 December 2005. 
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possible drafting of a Convention on Violence Against Women, perhaps based in part 
on the General Assembly Declaration on the same topic.24 This could include violence 
in conflict and would address lacunae in existing treaty law both in the area of human 
rights and humanitarian law. Alternatively, such an instrument could be appended as a 
Second Optional Protocol to the Women's Convention,25  to be monitored by the 
CEDAW Committee. 26  Scholars and advocates also looked to potential soft law 
development, in the absence of new treaty-making potential.27   For example, by 
                                                 
24 For a contemporary iteration of this argument, see McQuigg, R. (2017). Is it Time 
for a UN Treaty on Violence Against Women? International Journal of Human 
Rights, 22(3), 305-324. 
25 See Gardam and Jarvis (n 21), at 56.  For a full overview of possibilities and 
recommendations for a treaty on violence against women, see United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (2015). Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
violence against women, its causes and consequences, Rashida Manjoo, Human 
Rights Council. UN Doc. A/HRC/29/27 (June 10, 2015).  
26 Ibid. It could also be subjected to the individual complaints and inquiry procedures 
available in the current Optional Protocol to the Women's Convention, thus helping to 
develop jurisprudence in the area.  
27 Bennoune, K. (2006). Do we need New International Law to Protect Women in 
Armed Conflict? Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 38, 363. at 387-
390 summarizes the various proposed initiatives in detail. Gardam, J. (2005). ‘The 
Neglected Aspect of Women and Armed Conflict - Progressive Development of the 
Law.’ Netherlands International Law Review 197-2. She cites the following reports: 
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means of a General Assembly resolution, or Guiding Principles analogous to those 
addressing Internal Displacement developed by the Special Representative to the 
Secretary General Francis Deng.28 Gardam and Jarvis proposed the full text of such a 
set of Guiding Principles on the Protection of Women Affected by Armed Conflict. 29 
Notably, these proposals have looked outside of IHL, primarily to IHRL, in order to 
advance the protection of women’s rights in conflict. 
Ultimately, it is the most modest recuperative efforts, led by the ICRC,30 that have 
had the most practical significance. In the absence of potential new law-making, 
institutional efforts to improve the regime’s gender sensitivity have been led by the 
                                                                                                                                            
United Nations Secretary-General (2002). Report of the Secretary-General on 
Women, Peace and Security. Security Council. UN Doc. S/2002/1154; United Nations 
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (2001). Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, Ms Radhika 
Coomaraswamy, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/73, paragraphs 18, 19, 66; Fourth World 
Conference on Women, Action for Equality Development and Peace, Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action, UN Doc. A/Conf.177/20 (1995); Special session 
of the UN General Assembly entitled ‘Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development 
and Peace for the Twenty-First Century’, Unedited Final Outcome document, ‘Further 
Actions and Initiatives to Implement the Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action’, 10 June 2000, paragraph 12. 
28 Gardam and Jarvis (n 21), 58. 
29 Ibid, 58-67 
30 This chapter discusses the role of ICRC vis-à-vis IHL infra text at n 312.  
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ICRC and have focused on improved interpretation and operational implementation of 
existing law. These recuperative efforts have focused on progressive interpretation of 
existing treaty-based and customary IHL obligations, to include more direct 
articulation of women’s experience of conflict. The ICRC’s recognition of rape as a 
grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, as a matter of customary IHL,31 is the 
highest-profile but by no means the most significant of such activities. Further, a 
focus on improved operationalization of existing legal commitments has been site of 
productive engagement.32 Most notably, the 2001 study on Women Facing War made 
an assessment of the needs of women as civilians in armed conflict and as detainees 
and internees. 33  The study further outlined how the ICRC viewed such needs to 
already be addressed by IHL and the organisation’s operational response to those 
needs of women. As well as not impacting the sources of IHL, such efforts might also 
be critiqued for their relatively late emergence. 
                                                 
31 To clarify the status of rape under IHL, the ICRC issued an Aide-Mémoire in 1992 
stating that the grave breach regime in Article 147 GCIV 'obviously not only covers 
rape but also any other attack on a woman’s dignity’, International Committee of the 
Red Cross, Aide-Memoire, 3 December 1992, paragraph 2.  
32 International Committee of the Red Cross (2004). Addressing the Needs of Women 
Affected by Armed Conflict: An ICRC Guidance Document. Geneva, ICRC. 
33 International Committee of the Red Cross. (2001). Women Facing War: ICRC 
Study on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women. Geneva; ICRC.  
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Some discussion of the ICRC is also appropriate in discussing the sources of IHL, 
given the organisation’s unique mandate to develop IHL. 34  The organisation’s 
responsibility for the maintenance of the overall integrity of IHL means that it 
typically occupies a defensive and uncritical role of IHL as currently codified.35 This 
manifests in a tendency towards a defence of the status quo and conservatism in 
respect of IHL interpretation.36 One example of this conservatism is in the ICRC’s 
                                                 
34 See further infra, text commencing at n 308.  
35 According to the Statutes of the Movement, the ICRC has a status of its own (sui 
generis), Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 
adopted by the 25th International Conference of the Red Cross at Geneva in October 
1986 and amended by the 26th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent at Geneva in December 1995 and by the 29th International Conference of 
the Red Cross.  As a private association under Swiss law, the ICRC is not an 
intergovernmental organization. However, in contrast to non-governmental 
organizations, the ICRC’s recognized international legal personality enables it to sign 
headquarters agreements with States to provide its personnel, premises and 
correspondence with diplomatic protection. See further Sandoz, Y. (1996). The 
International Committee of the Red Cross as Guardian of International Humanitarian 
Law. Yugoslav Review of International Law reproduced at 
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc/about-the-icrc-311298.htm. 
36 ‘A careful look at these texts, however, shows that they remain valid on the whole 
and that the difficulties encountered nowadays arise chiefly from the fact that the 
means and the will to implement them are lacking. The problem is therefore more 
political than legal.’ Ibid, 2. David Forsythe sets forth the criticism as follows: ‘The 
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major study on the protection of women during armed conflict, Women Facing War, 
which found that current treaty-based protections are sufficient, though improved 
compliance is necessary. 37  This is a conclusion widely disputed by feminist 
scholars.38 A further example is the fate of proposals from women’s rights advocates 
for more creative interpretation of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols 
to respond to more modern understanding of the adverse impact of conflict on 
women’s lives.  
The ICRC is explicit that its role is not the transformation of gender social relations, 
rather its ‘policies and programmes are directed towards meeting the needs of 
                                                                                                                                            
more critical view sees the ICRC as ultra-slow to change, still controlled at the top by 
excessively cautious traditionalists who are much affected by Swiss society and 
political culture, including some of its negative manifestations – like being risk-
averse, unilateralist and slow to recognize gender and racial equality.’ Forsythe, D. 
(2007). The ICRC: A Unique Humanitarian Protagonist. International Review of the 
Red Cross, 89(865): 63-96, 64.  
37 International Committee of the Red Cross (n 33). 
38 For example, Gardam, J. (2005). The Neglected Aspect of Women and Armed 
Conflict-Progressive Development of the Law. Netherlands International Law 
Review, 197-219; Bennoune, K. (2006). Do we need New International Law to 
Protect Women in Armed Conflict? Case Western Reserve Journal of International 
Law, 38, 363.  
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women’.39 It attributes this position to the specifics of its mandate, namely protection 
and assistance, and to guard and promote IHL; ‘[t]he ICRC is not mandated to 
engineer social change with respect to the status of either sex in the cultures in which 
it works’.40 Further  
as a neutral, impartial and apolitical institution, it is not the role of the ICRC to 
engage in controversies of an ideological, religious or political nature, such as 
the debate about gendered power relations. Highlighting social inequalities in 
terms of rights and resources and pushing to establish a balance in power 
relations is a political act incompatible with the neutrality principle.41 
The ICRC has deemed gendered power relations to be a subject of activity 
incompatible with its core principles. Given the organisation’s unique mandate for 
IHL development, the prospect of future IHL law-making addressing such matters 
appears further diminished.  
The absence of meaningful prospect for law-making has shaped a relative lack of 
feminist engagement with IHL.42 Instead, in much discussion of IHL, in particular by 
feminists and women’s rights advocates, almost exclusive concern is given to its 
                                                 
39  International Committee of the Red Cross. (2004). Addressing the Needs of 
Women Affected by Armed Conflict: An ICRC Guidance Document. Geneva: ICRC, 
7-8.   
40 Ibid.   
41 Ibid.   
42 As noted by Gardam (n 5).  
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criminal elements. While Geneva Law does require states to pursue domestic 
prosecutions for the serious violations of IHL,43 the thrust and focus of IHL is its 
protective and non-criminal focus. IHL is intended to limit the belligerent activities of 
state and non-state armed groups, largely on a basis – not of criminal sanction – but of 
reciprocity between warring factions. Commentators such as Judith Gardam argue 
that feminist engagement with IHL has been unhelpfully and unproductively focused 
on the crime element of the canon, at the expense of a more developed focus on 
advancing its protection purpose and mandate, which offers the potential of 
                                                 
43 The ‘grave breaches’ provisions of the four Geneva Conventions and Protocol 1 
identify the rules whose violations States are under a duty to prosecute or extradite, 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31, 
article 50; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea (Second Geneva 
Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85, article 51; Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 
UNTS 135, article 130; and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287, 
article 147; Protocol 1 (n 11), article 85. The 1998 Statute of the International 
Criminal Court is the most recent codification of violations of IHL for which there is 
international criminal responsibility, Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(Rome Statute), 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3. 
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preventing violations against women.44 In contrast to IHL, however, ICL has offered 
the scope for very significant feminist input and influence on foundational sources.  
 
International Criminal Law 
The origins of ICL are typically located in the post-World War II prosecutions of axis 
powers in Nuremberg and Tokyo. However, contemporary ICL occupies a much more 
disparate space. Its implementation and evolution occurs across ad hoc tribunals 
established by the UNSC, so-called ‘hybrid’ tribunals involving both international and 
domestic jurisdiction,45 the International Criminal Court, and in domestic criminal 
courts giving effect to ICL. As such, while the origins of ICL is linked to the statutes 
of the Nuremberg46 and Tokyo47 tribunals and the later statutes of the ad hoc tribunals 
for Rwanda48 and the former Yugoslavia,49 the contemporary statement of ICL is 
                                                 
44 Ibid.  
45 Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL Statute), 30 May 2007, UNSC 
Resolution 1757 (2007); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL Statute), 
16 January 2002, UNSC Resolution 246 (2002).  
46 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, 8 August 1945, 82 UNTS 279.  
47 International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter (IMTFE Charter), January 
19, 1946. 
48 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 8 November 1994, 
UNSC Resolution 955 (1994) [hereafter ICTR Statute].  
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contained in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and will continue 
to evolve through judicial development at national, hybrid and international levels.50  
ICL has been the site of prolific feminist engagement in international law-making. 
ICL provides, uniquely, for the prosecution of individual perpetrators for 
‘international crimes’, defined as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and 
aggression. In contrast to the static treaty development of IHL since the adoption of 
the Additional Protocols I and II in 1977, ICL has been a highly dynamic area of law-
making since 1990. It is its dynamism that has attracted so much feminist 
engagement. The opportunity to influence foundational texts (and landmark 
jurisprudence, as a subsidiary source of international law)51 offers considerable appeal 
to advocates.  
Because of its role in prosecuting war crimes, ICL is usefully conceived as the 
enforcement element of IHL. The interaction between IHL and ICL meant that legal 
developments in ICL have offered the promise of ameliorating some of the most 
egregious gendered deficiencies of IHL. The Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals for 
Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia use a more expansive meaning of IHL, in that 
they include crimes against humanity and genocide. Further, these tribunals undertake 
                                                                                                                                            
49 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY 
Statute), 25 May 1993, UNSC Resolution 827.  
50 Rome Statute (n 43).  
51 Statute of the International Court of Justice (n 14).  
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a significant law-making role,52 albeit of a very different nature to treaty and custom. 
This law-making role has addressed virtually every aspect of IHL’s categories and 
definitions.53 Thus, following the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals, considerable 
transnational feminist organising set out to influence the tribunal interpretations of 
their mandates, in particular in terms of sexual and gender-based crimes. Landmark 
successes in this regard were judicial decisions recognising rape as a ‘grave breach’ of 
the Geneva Conventions, 54  and constitutive of crimes against humanity 55  and 
genocide.56 
The Rome Statute of 1998 is often identified as the high watermark of feminist 
influence in international law-making. 57  The International Criminal Court is, 
                                                 
52 See further Darcy, S. (2014). Judges, Law and War: The Judicial Development of 
International Humanitarian Law. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
53 Ibid.  
54 Prosecutor v. Tadić, ICTY, No. IT-94-1-T, 7 May 1997. 
55 ICTY Statute (n 49), article 5(g); ICTR Statute (n 48), article 8; SCSL Statute (n 
45), article 2(g).  
56 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR, No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998. 
57 Bedont, B. and K. Hall Martinez (1999). ‘Ending Impunity for Gender Crimes 
under the International Criminal Court.’ The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 6(1): 
65-85. Oosterveld, V. (2014). Constructive Ambiguity and the Meaning of ‘Gender’ 
for the International Criminal Court. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 16(4), 
563-580. 
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uniquely, the permanent international court established to prosecute international 
crimes in situations in which the relevant state party is ‘unwilling or unable’58 to 
pursue domestic prosecutions. Highly successful advocacy targeted the negotiation of 
the Rome Statute, which achieved codification in treaty of jurisprudential 
developments at the ad hoc tribunals, supplemented by several other measures, such 
as the recognition of gender as the potential basis of persecution59 and improved 
provision for gender representation at the Court. 60  The International Law 
Commission’s draft treaty text contained no references to gender,61 yet the ultimate 
treaty text contained nine separate such references. This is a powerful indicator of the 
success of feminist advocacy in the negotiation of the treaty. 
International law not only allows states to prosecute international crimes, but also 
encourages, and even obligates them under certain circumstances, to do so.62 This will 
happen either through the domestic application of ICL (for example, domestic 
legislation giving effect to the Rome Statute), or more commonly, by applying 
domestic law. The prosecuting states may exercise jurisdiction according to 
                                                 
58 Rome Statute (n 43), article 17.  
59 Ibid, article 7(1)(h). 
60 Ibid, article 36(8)(a).  
61  International Law Commission, Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, Report of the International Law Commission to the General 
Assembly, 51 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 88, UN Doc. A/51/10 (1996).  
62 Rome Statute (n 43), Preamble: ‘it is the duty of every state to exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes’.  
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territoriality or nationality, but they may also legitimately claim universal jurisdiction 
over crimes committed outside their territory by and against foreigners. 63  The 
potential enforcement of ICL through international, hybrid and domestic courts posit 
a broad range of potential international and domestic sources of law. Moreover, the 
‘complementary’ jurisdiction of the ICC can only be established in the event that a 
state party is ‘unwilling or unable’ to pursue domestic prosecutions for international 
crimes. Thus domestic criminal law remains an enduring source and factor in the 
operation of ICL.    
It is acknowledged that, in comparison to the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC’s role as law-
maker is likely to be more circumscribed, not least given the accession to its 
jurisdiction to date of 124 state parties. Given the importance of judicial activism in 
enumerating gender crimes through the ad hoc tribunals, the likely diminished 
significance of judicial decisions going forward may have important gender 
implications. In contrast to the more limited application of the judgments of the ad 
hoc international tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia to the small number of directly 
affected states, the jurisprudence of the ICC has a more general quality. As such, 
states are more cautious in empowering the institutions and its agents. For example, 
certain institutional factors limit the scope for judicial activism at the ICC, such as 
article 61(11) which precludes the addition of new charges after the commencement 
                                                 
63  See further International Committee of the Red Cross Advisory Service on 
International Humanitarian Law, ‘Universal Jurisdiction over War Crimes’, available 
at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/2014/universal-jurisdiction-icrc-eng.pdf.  
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of the trial.64 This provision is much more restrictive than what existed at the ad hoc 
tribunals. Whereas the tribunal judges had the right to amend charges during the trial, 
the designers of the Rome Statute provided the more limited option of 
recharacterizing the charges. 65  These formal rules are reinforced by so-called 
‘informal gender rules’,66 for example in the assumptions of prosecutors, relying on 
often inappropriate methods for the investigation of sexual and gender-based crimes, 
that such crimes are necessarily harder to investigate and prove in court, ‘a view 
judges have encouraged and reinforced’. 67  
                                                 
64 Rome Statute (n 43), article 61(1). 
65 Regulation 55 permits the Court to re-characterise the facts in order to accord with 
crimes under articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute, International Criminal Court 
Regulations, ICC-01/04-01/06-1891-tENG. See further infra Chapter 5 and Schabas, 
William A. 2017. An Introduction to the International Criminal Court. 4th ed. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 308. 
66 See further Mackay, F., Kenny, M., & Chappell, L. (2010). New Institutionalism 
through a Gender Lens: Towards a Feminist Institutionalism? International Political 
Science Review, 31, 573. 
67 Chappell, L. The Politics of Gender Justice at the International Criminal Court: 
Legacies and Legitimacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, iii; Chappell, L., R. Grey 
and E. Waller (2013). ‘The Gender Justice Shadow of Complementarity: Lessons 
from the International Criminal Court's Preliminary Examinations in Guinea and 
Colombia.’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 7: 455-475. 
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The sources of ICL have, therefore, been relatively open to feminist influence and 
progressive codification. Nevertheless, considerable concern persists – is arguably 
growing, in fact – concerning the efficacy of such feminist interventions. In practical 
terms, concerns arise from the very small number of victims reached through 
prosecutions, but also more broadly due ICL’s focus on punishment over protection, 
as well as the essential reliance on flawed institutions to operationalize ostensibly 
progressive treaty measures.  
 
International Human Rights Law 
Uniquely in international law terms, women’s rights are given a specialist treaty basis 
in IHRL by the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW). For a long time, the ‘specialist’ nature of women’s rights 
constituted a ‘women’s ghetto’ in the international human rights system. 68   In 
institutional terms, the human rights treaties emerge from the human rights role 
formally attributed to ECOSOC under the UN Charter.69 ECOSOC gave practical 
expression to this mandate by quickly establishing both a Commission on Human 
                                                 
68 Charlesworth, H. (1994). What are ‘women's international human rights’? In R. J. 
Cook (Ed.), Human Rights of Women: National and International Perspectives. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 60.  
69 Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945. Further, articles 55 and 56 pledge 
member states to take cooperative action to promote universal respect and observance 
of human rights. 
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Rights and a Commission on the Status of Women.70 Initial drafts of the human rights 
treaties emerged from these bodies, further scrutinized by the relevant Committees of 
the General Assembly and ultimately adopted by the General Assembly. The 
‘specialist’ nature of women’s human rights took institutional expression in the 
distinct operation of the Commission on the Status of Women from the Commission 
on Human Rights, and the specialist treaty basis of CEDAW and its monitoring 
committee. This tension between ‘mainstream’ and ‘specialist’ protection of the 
human rights of women presents enduring dilemmas for women’s rights advocates 
seeking enhanced protection for women’s rights in conflict under IHRL.  
The foundational source of IHRL is the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
Intended as a political consensus document, the Declaration was translated into a 
formal set of treaty obligations with the adoption of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights71 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.72 There are, at the time of writing, nine broad themes of international 
human rights treaties, which are informally divided into the ‘mainstream’ treaties for 
universal application principally – though not exclusively – dedicated to the 
                                                 
70 Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) resolution establishing the Commission 
on Human Rights and the Subcommission on the Status of Women, 21 June 1946, 
ECOSOC Res 11, UN Doc E/RES/2/11. 
71  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 16 December 
1966, 999 UNTS 171. 
72 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 16 
December 1966, 993 UNTS 3. 
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protection of civil and political rights,73 and ‘specialist’ treaties for the protection of 
certain sub-groups of rights-holders, specifically women, children, people with 
disabilities and migrant workers. 74  The so-called ‘specialist’ treaties can be seen 
broadly as a response to identified shortcomings and solipsism of the ‘mainstream’ 
system. More specifically, the adoption of CEDAW can reasonably be seen as an 
acknowledgment of the gendered gaps of the so-called ‘mainstream’ human rights 
treaties adopted hitherto. (Indeed, this is expressly acknowledged in the Preamble to 
CEDAW.75)  
                                                 
73  ICCPR (n 71); ICESCR (n 72); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85; 
and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, 2716 UNTS 3. 
74 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), 18 December 1979, 1249 UNTS 13; International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 
195; Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 
3; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 13 December 2006, 2515 
UNTS 3; and the International Convention for the Protection of All Migrant Workers 
and their Families, 18 December 1990, 2220 UNTS 3.  
75 ‘Noting that the States Parties to the International Covenants on Human Rights 
have the obligation to ensure the equal rights of men and women to enjoy all 
economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights… Concerned, however, that 
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Treaties are the paradigmatic source of international law. The existence of multiple 
multilateral human rights treaties – without any clear hierarchy between treaties and 
involving different subgroups of state parties – is part of the essential pluralism of 
IHRL and indeed international law more broadly. Likewise, the different human 
rights treaty monitoring bodies operate autonomously and without any clear 
hierarchy, interpreting many of the same principles through their state party 
monitoring, development of general comments and recommendations, and decisions 
in communications. Further, the treaty-monitoring bodies borrow approaches and 
interpretations eclectically across one another. Thus, precedents are adopted and 
developed in a very ad hoc and non-linear manner. While the ‘mainstream’ 
instruments are very widely – almost universally – ratified, the specialist instruments 
enjoy much more varying levels of ratification. CEDAW and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, for example, have 189 and 196 state parties, respectively; the 
Migrant Workers Convention has just 51 state parties. In addition to these nine rights-
affirming treaties, which establish independent treaty monitoring bodies, are nine 
further treaties establishing enforcement procedures, such as individual 
communications or inquiry procedures, to the mainstream and specialist treaties.76 
                                                                                                                                            
despite these various instruments extensive discrimination against women continues 
to exist,’ CEDAW (n 74), Preamble.  
76 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 
December 1966, 999 UNTS 171; Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, 
15 December 1989, 1642 UNTS 414; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 6 October 1999, 2131 
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These enforcement procedure treaties are less widely ratified than the treaties to 
which they relate. A final category of human rights treaty is the regional human rights 
treaty, such as the European77 and American78 Conventions on Human Rights and the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.79 While the treaty obligations and the 
jurisprudence emerging from regional human rights courts are binding only on parties 
to respective treaties, in practice the regional systems borrow across one another. This 
cross-regional borrowing can be significant for the protection of women’s rights, such 
as the Inter-American court’s doctrine of ‘due diligence’ obligation on states to 
                                                                                                                                            
UNTS 83; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict, 25 May 2000, 2173 UNTS 222; Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child 
prostitution and child pornography, 25 May 2000, 2171 UNTS 227; Optional Protocol 
to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, 18 December 2002, 2375 UNTS 237; Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 13 December 2006, 2518 
UNTS 283; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 10 December 2008, 2922 UNTS Reg No 14531; Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure, 19 
December 2011, 2983 UNTS Reg No 27531. 
77  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221. 
78 American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123. 
79 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, 1520 UNTS 217. 
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prohibit, prevent and punish violations perpetrated by private actors.80 While this 
tapestry of treaty commitments and enforcement procedures are referred to 
collectively as the international system for the protection of human rights, the extent 
to which this network of treaty commitments constitutes a ‘system’ is in fact 
debateable.  
Understanding the sources of IHRL is further complicated by the widespread practice 
by states of entering reservations to human rights treaties. While they are an issue 
across human rights treaties, CEDAW bears the unfortunate distinction of being the 
human rights treaty subject to the largest number of reservations by ratifying states.81 
According to Charlesworth and Chinkin, ‘some states have used the reservation 
mechanism effectively to hollow out the heart of their formal obligations’.82 These 
widespread reservations likewise erode the capacity of the treaty monitoring body to 
effectively monitor and enforce the Convention’s protections of women’s rights in 
conflict against all state parties. A further concern in terms of the sources of IHRL is 
the ‘soft law’ status of much of the most progressive articulations of women’s rights, 
                                                 
80 See further Londoño, P. (2009). Developing Human Rights Principles in Cases of 
Gender-based Violence: Opuz v Turkey in the European Court of Human Rights. 
Human Rights Law Review, 9(4), 657-667. 
81 See generally Cook, R. (1990). Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination of Women. Virginia Journal of International Law, 30, 
643-716. 
82 Charlesworth, H., & Chinkin, C. (2000). The Boundaries of International Law: A 
Feminist Analysis. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 113. 
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both in conflict and beyond. Soft law instruments such as general comments and 
recommendations form an important treaty interpretative function for generally 
worded human rights treaties. They have been very important for advancing feminist 
articulations of women’s human rights.  
In the case of the CEDAW Committee, developing soft law is a unique and critical 
activity in advancing feminist-informed interpretations of CEDAW provisions and, 
ultimately, in shaping normative development of IHRL. The Committee undertakes 
this work in particular by articulating authoritative interpretations of the Convention 
through its General Recommendations. The Convention guarantees broad rights of 
non-discrimination against women and the Committee plays a key role in developing 
and interpreting the application of those broad rights to specific settings and 
challenges. Under the CEDAW’s article 21, the General Recommendations are 
informed by the Committee’s state monitoring activities and focus on cross-cutting 
systematic or structural issues that are best dealt with by a more general statement to 
all state parties. They are to be distinguished from the narrower recommendations 
tailored to specific state parties that are made in Concluding Observations. Yet, they 
have only persuasive status under international law. As such, they are not formally 
considered sources of international law and face resistance to their strict application 
by some state parties.83 
                                                 
83  See, for example, objections expressed by Egypt in the 2016 Arria Formula 
Meeting between the UNSC and CEDAW, see further ‘Pursuing Synergies to 
Guarantee Women’s Rights in Conflict: The UNSC Arria Formula Meeting on 
CEDAW and the Women, Peace and Security Resolutions’, February 8, 2017, 
available at https://ilg2.org/2017/02/08/pursuing-synergies-to-guarantee-womens-
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Human rights soft law does not emerge only from the treaty bodies. The so-called 
‘Charter-based’ bodies, which draw their legal basis from the human rights provisions 
of the UN Charter 84  and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 85  likewise 
generate human rights soft law. Most prolifically, the Human Rights Council 
(formerly the Commission on Human Rights) adopts resolutions that make 
recommendations to the General Assembly for the progressive development of human 
rights law. 86  Although not formally binding, as an intergovernmental body with 
relatively broad membership,87 Human Rights Council resolutions indicate consensus 
amongst states on the substance of human rights norms. They can, in turn, inform 
General Assembly resolutions on human rights themes, such as the Basic Principles 
on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations88 and the Declaration on the Elimination of 
Violence Against Women.89     
                                                                                                                                            
rights-in-conflict-the-un-security-council-arria-formula-meeting-on-cedaw-and-the-
women-peace-and-security-resolutions/. 
84 UN Charter (n 69), article 1(3).  
85  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA Resolution 217 A(III) of 10 
December 1948. 
86 UNGA Resolution 60/251 (2006), paragraph 5(c).  
87 Ibid, paragraph 7, providing for the Council to consist of 47 UN member states, 
based on equitable geographical distribution and elected on a rotating basis.  
88 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
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On occasion, women’s civil society has endeavoured to develop guidelines and 
recommendations on particular subjects of human rights. Two examples are the 
Montréal Principles on Women’s Economic, Social and Cultural Rights90 and the 
Nairobi Declaration on Women’s and Girls’ Right to a Remedy and Reparation.91 The 
Montréal Principles sought to assist in ‘understanding and determining violations of 
economic, social and cultural rights and in providing remedies thereto’ by adding a 
gender dimension. The Nairobi Declaration addressed the silence on gender of the 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims 
of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law.92 As instruments produced by civil society, these 
efforts fall outside the formal sources of international (and hence human rights) law as 
set out in the Statute of the ICJ, Article 38(1). They do not carry even in the ‘indirect’ 
legal effect of soft law. Rather, they are prepared in the hope that they will be adopted 
                                                                                                                                            
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, adopted and proclaimed by UN 
General Assembly Resolution 60/147, 16 December 2005. 
89  Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, UN General 
Assembly, 20 December 1993, UN Doc. A/RES/48/104. 
90 Montréal Principles on Women’s Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Human 
Rights Quarterly, 26, 760–780 (2004). 
91 See further Couillard, V. (2007). The Nairobi Declaration: Redefining Reparations 
for Women Victims of Sexual Violence. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 
1, 444-453. 
92 Ibid.   
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by other international actors, cited and applied by decision and policy-makers and 
thus come to be accepted as contributing to the corpus of international law. Their 
influence will depend in each instance on such factors as the quality of the text, the 
standing of the authors and the degree of acceptance.93 
IHRL draws from diverse treaty sources. Combined with a diffuse system of treaty 
interpretation and norm development, this opens considerable space for the creative 
and resourceful advocate to advance expansive and progressive articulations of 
women’s rights in conflict. Likewise, it can also make ostensible progress on 
women’s rights within one treaty system or body more difficult to consolidate across 
IHRL.94 Such is the essential pluralism of IHRL.  
 
United Nations Security Council 
The UNSC operates on the basis of a universally ratified treaty, namely the United 
Nations Charter of 1945.95 The UNSC has the responsibility to weigh the evidence in 
                                                 
93 Account taken from Freeman, M. A., Chinkin, C., & Rudolf, B. (2012). The UN 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: A 
Commentary. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 24.  
94 Consider the diverse approaches in access to abortion under the different treaty 
monitoring bodies, see further Zampas, C., & Gher, J. M. (2008). Abortion as a 
Human Right - International and Regional Standards. Human Rights Law Review, 
8(2), 249-294. 
95 UN Charter (n 69), Chapter V.  
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individual circumstances and to identify threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, 
and acts of aggression.96 In determining the appropriate response to situations on its 
agenda, the UNSC can choose between its recommendatory powers under Chapter VI 
for the ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’97 or its binding powers under Chapter VII for 
‘Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of 
Aggression’.98 Envisaged as the enforcement body of the United Nations, the UNSC 
has unique authority to make binding decisions 99  and extraordinary powers that 
include the authorisation of the use of force.100 Those extraordinary powers reflect the 
primary mandate of the organ, namely ‘the maintenance of international peace and 
security’.101  
While the UN Charter mandates UN member states to ‘accept and carry out’ decisions 
of the UNSC, 102  it is decisions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
                                                 
96 Ibid, article 39.  
97 Zampas, C., & Gher, J. M. (2008). Abortion as a Human Right - International and 
Regional Standards. Human Rights Law Review, 8(2), 249-294. 
98 See generally UN Charter (n 69), Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of Disputes. 
99 UN Charter (n 69), article 25.    
100 Ibid.  
101 Ibid, article 24(1).   
102 Ibid, article 25  
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(International Peace and Security) that are binding in nature.103 On this basis, the 
UNSC can regulate state behaviour worldwide and for extended periods.104 Thus, in 
cases such as Iraq, former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, embargoes on certain products, 
services and action were in force over years, binding the behavior of all states, not 
just targeted states. But although this constitutes legislation in form, it is, in principle, 
confined to specific situations and preliminary effects;105 it ends when the threat to the 
peace that has given rise to the measure disappears. Thus, such law creation might, in 
substance, be regarded as analogous to executive regulations rather than to true 
legislation. 106  Being primarily endowed with a police function, the UNSC is, in 
principle, not in a position to create general legal rules directly. Any law-making that 
reaches further than the concrete case can only be reached in an indirect way.107 
UNSC resolutions might provide indication of existing state practice or form a 
starting point for future developments, but unlike General Assembly resolutions, 
action by the UNSC is immediately supported only by its fifteen members and 
                                                 
103 See, for example, ‘Extending the Mandate of the UN Operation in Iraq: Options’, 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg43716/pdf/CHRG-
110hhrg43716.pdf. 
104 Simma, B., Mosler, H., Paulus, A., & Chaitidou, E. (2002). The Charter of the 
United Nations: a commentary (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 708 
105 Ibid, 708. 
106 Ibid, 709. 
107 Ibid. 
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therefore cannot claim to represent the view of the whole international community.108 
In order to produce new law, additional elements of state practice are necessary.  
Despite being quite clear in the Charter, the evidence of the UNSC nevertheless 
assuming legislative and quasi-legislative authority is manifest. Interestingly, the 
issue of women’s rights in conflict has been prominent in such activity. The UNSC 
has been the site of some of the most significant recent developments regarding 
women’s rights in armed conflict under international law. To illustrate, the UNSC 
made a first ambitious step towards embedding women’s rights in conflict within its 
agenda by the adoption of resolution 1325 on WPS in October 2000. 109  Seven 
additional WPS resolutions have since been adopted. Three focus broadly on 
advancing the women’s participation pillars110 and four focus on sexual violence in 
armed conflict.111 These UNSC attempts to set, though in a non-binding manner, 
standards for certain areas such as WPS indicate its adoption of a quasi-legislative 
function.  
                                                 
108 Ibid. 
109  UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000). 
110  UNSC Resolution 1889 (2009); UNSC Resolution 2122 (2013); UNSC 
Resolution 2242 (2015). 
111  UNSC Resolution 1820 (2008); UNSC Resolution 1888 (2009); UNSC 
Resolution 1960 (2010); UNSC Resolution 2106 (2013). 
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The legal status of so-called ‘thematic’ resolution, such as WPS – and indeed the 
‘law-making’ capacity of the UNSC – has been the subject of heavy contestation.112 
Such thematic activity commenced with ostensibly humanitarian and ‘human 
security’ focused concerns, namely the protection of civilians, women and children in 
armed conflict.113  In its response to the terrorist attacks on the United States of 
September 11, 2001, however, the Council has proceeded to legislate for counter-
terror in a far more direct way: it has created obligations for States to take action 
against terrorism in general and has enacted many of the provisions contained in 
earlier conventions against terrorism under Chapter VII, without confining itself to 
the concrete case.114 Although the Council action has been unanimous, without the 
objection of any state, it remains difficult to justify under the UN Charter. If, 
however, states continue to endorse the exercise of true legislative functions by the 
Council, the original Charter conception might undergo significant change, as it has 
already done in other areas.115 There has not been a clear feminist position per se on 
the question of the UNSC’s law-making capacity.  
There are several reasons to be concerned about the UNSC’s development of 
legislative and quasi-legislative functions, based on accountability, participation, 
                                                 
112 Szasz, P. C. (2002). The Security Council Starts Legislating. American Journal of 
International Law, 96(4), 901-905. 
113 Simma et al (n 104), 709 
114 UNSC Resolution 1373, 2001). See further ibid. 
115 Simma et al (n 104), 709. 
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procedural fairness and transparency of decision-making.116 Boyle and Chinkin note 
that the UNSC is not a representative body and, as a result, its legislative action can 
lack legitimacy and acceptability to non-members.117 Procedurally, its negotiations 
are in private, involving UNSC member states only.118 The power that this gives the 
UNSC, in particular the permanent members, violates the principle of sovereign 
equality of states and the principal that states must consent to new obligations under 
international law.119 There is no real scope for challenging or judicially reviewing the 
UNSC’s decisions. 120  Further, permanent members of the UNSC can veto any 
resolution that affects its interests or those of its allies, resulting in grave 
inconsistency in the operation of the Council. These concerns and flaws in UNSC 
law-making are particularly worrying to states in the global south, whose interests are 
represented in the Council by only a handful of non-permanent members: 
The Security Council is a seriously deficient vehicle for the exercise of 
legislative competence. Dominated by the permanent members, or sometimes 
by only one or two of them, unrepresentative and undemocratic, its quasi-
                                                 
116 Boyle, A., & Chinkin, C. (2007). The Making of International Law. Oxford & 
NY: Oxford University Press. 114-115, 229-232. 
117 Ibid, 114. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Ibid. Efforts by some smaller states to include a provision in the Charter to permit 
ICJ review of SC decisions affecting the essential rights of states was rejected. Simma 
et al (n 104), 703. 
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legislative powers can only be justified by reference to the paramount urgency 
and importance of its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security.121 
Importantly, Boyle and Chinkin note, ‘the increasing prominence of the UNSC in the 
dynamics of international law-making marks an important shift of power and 
influence away from the General Assembly’.122 
These ostensibly quite formalistic questions regarding the sources of international law 
and the appropriateness of the UNSC’s law-making on women’s rights in conflict 
have been the subject of relatively little feminist analysis. 123  Rather, feminist 
engagement has tended to focus on implementation problems of the WPS agenda,124 
as well as more abstract theoretical critique of representations of gender through the 
                                                 
121 Ibid, 115. 
122 Ibid. 
123  But see O'Rourke, C. (2017). Feminist Strategy in International Law: 
Understanding its Legal, Normative and Political Dimensions. European Journal of 
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124 See, for example, the United Nations. (2015). Preventing Conflict, Transforming 
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WPS resolutions.125 More considered reflection on the sources of law for the UNSC 
activities, it is submitted, might usefully inform productive engagement with UNSC’s 
Charter-based powers of authorising peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions, 
country-specific resolutions, sanctions and referrals to the ICC. It might, likewise, 
move feminists away from advocating (implicitly at least) a formal law-making rule 
for a UN organ with such unrepresentative, even problematic, composition.  
 
Definitions of Conflict and Women’s Rights 
Contrasting legal definitions of conflict with women’s lived experience is a core 
entry-point of feminist engagement and analysis of international law. Observations 
such as ‘there is no aftermath for women’126 point to the inadequacies of international 
law in defining and reflecting conflict experience in ways that align with the diverse 
experiences of women. Much feminist critique focuses on the inadequacy of the legal 
definition of conflict in capturing women’s experiences of, for example, the 
continuities between pre-, during and post-conflict violence.127 However, even under 
international law, the definition of ‘conflict’ is not the subject of legal consensus. 
Under IHL, ICL, IHRL and the UNSC, varying definitions and thresholds apply. The 
                                                 
125 For example Shepherd, L. (2017). Gender, UN Peacebuilding and the Politics of 
Space. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
126 Meintjes, S., Pillay, A., & Turshen, M. (Eds.). (2001). The Aftermath: Women in 
Post-Conflict Transformation. London & NY: Zed Books. 
127  Swaine, A. (2018) Conflict-related Violence Against Women: Transforming 
Transitions. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.  
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more technical definition of IHL contrasts with the broad and flexible definition 
offered, for example, by the CEDAW Committee. The UNSC offers an even more 
limited definition, confined to ‘threats to international peace and security’. 128 
Moreover, no definition of conflict is clearly more, or less, ‘women-friendly’. Rather 
the significance of the conflict definition is that it determines which regime or 
regimes apply to specific conflict-settings, which in turn determines the underpinning 
definition of women’s rights, the monitoring body and enforcement procedure 
involved, and the opportunities for women’s participation.  
In their underpinning definitions of women’s rights, the regimes differ importantly 
between the protection and prevention emphasis of IHL, the punishment and anti-
impunity emphasis of ICL, the women’s rights and equality emphasis of IHRL and 
the collective security focus of the UNSC. The section elucidates these differences, as 
well as discussing the varying definitions of sexual violence in armed conflict that 
underpins each regime.  
The term ‘conflict-related sexual violence’ is increasingly popular in scholarship129 
and policy-making.130 One broad definition of conflict-related sexual violence that is 
commonly utilised comes from the United Nations Secretary-General as ‘sexual 
                                                 
128 UN Charter (n 69), Chapter VII.  
129 See especially Swaine (n 127). 
130  See, for example, UN Women. (2010). Addressing Conflict-related Sexual 
Violence: An Analytical Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice. New York; UN 
Department of Political Affairs. (2012). Guidance for Mediators: Addressing Conflict-
related Sexual Violence in Ceasefire and Peace Agreements. New York.  
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violence occurring in a conflict or post-conflict setting that has a direct or indirect 
causal link with the conflict itself’. 131  Conflict-related sexual violence includes 
manifestations of violence that may reach the tactic of war threshold132 as well as 
sexual violence against civilians within the wider context of the conflict. Conflict-
related sexual violence can be individual and collective, and the harms that ensue are 
physical, moral, emotional, social, immediate, and intergenerational.133 Acts falling 
within the definition of conflict-related sexual violence include rape, forced 
pregnancy, forced sterilization, forced abortion, forced prostitution, trafficking, sexual 
                                                 
131  UN Secretary-General. (2010). Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1820 (2008) and 1888 (2009), U.N. 
Doc. A/65/592-S/2010/604, paragraph 5.  
132 Eriksson Baaz, M. and Stern, M. (2013). Sexual Violence as A Weapon of War? 
Perceptions, Prescriptions, Problems in The Congo And Beyond. London: Zed Books, 
45–46. 
133  See Rubio-Marin, R. (2012). Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual and 
Reproductive Violence: A Decalogue. Wm. & Mary J. Women & L 19, 69 - 104, 74–
76; See also United Nations Secretary-General. (2012). Report of the Secretary-
General on Conflict-related sexual violence. Security Council. UN Doc. A/66/657–
S/2012/33 (discussing implementation of United Nations initiatives and providing 
information on continuing violations); U.N. Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs Division for the Advancement of Women. (1998). Sexual Violence and Armed 
Conflict: United Nations Response. Women2000, archived at http://perma.cc/ZD6U-
C9BA. 
 95 
enslavement, and forced nudity.134  This broad definition, however, is not strictly 
legal. It does not align with the regimes under scrutiny. As the section elucidates, the 
regimes differ in the acts that constitute sexual violence and in how the relationship to 
conflict is determined.  
Ultimately, the book utilizes the language of women’s rights in conflict not to pretend 
some reconciled consensus around core concepts, but to illustrate key sites of 
divergence between the regimes. These lines of divergence are explored more fully in 
this section. 
International Humanitarian Law 
Stagnant treaty-development is not the only grounds for broad feminist 
disengagement with IHL. In addition, IHL is built on very involved definitions and 
categories of conflict that struggle to capture either women’s experiences or the most 
common contemporary manifestations of conflict.  
Uniquely of the four regimes, the presence of armed conflict is required in order to 
apply most of the corpus of IHL. Consequently, the question of conflict thresholds is 
most assiduously addressed under IHL. An authoritative definition of armed conflict 
was provided by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the landmark 1995 Interlocutory 
Appeal Decision on Jurisdiction in Prosecutor v Tadić: ‘an armed conflict exists 
whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such 
                                                 
134 UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict. (2011). Analytical & Conceptual 
Framing of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence 1, archived at http://perma.cc/D97Z-
YJDC. 
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groups within a State’. 135  Parties to conflict are bound by the interrelated core 
principles of customary IHL that are relevant to the conduct of any armed conflict, 
namely the obligation of distinguish between civilians and combatants and target only 
the latter. While civilians cannot be targeted, all harm to civilians is not prohibited. 
Rather such harm must accord with principles of proportionality136 and precaution in 
attack.137 In addition, methods and means of combat should not cause ‘unnecessary 
suffering’.138 
                                                 
135 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-9-1-AR72, Appeals Chamber, Decision on the 
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, paragraph 
70.  
136 A party is required to forego any offensive where the incidental damage expected 
‘is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’. See 
International Committee of Red Cross, Customary IHL Database, Rule 14, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule14.  
137 Prior to any attack, all feasible precautions must be taken to ensure that the 
subject of the attack are legitimate military objectives, and to minimize incidental loss 
of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. Where a civilian 
population is reasonably expected to be affected by the attack, ‘effective advance 
warning’ must be given to the civilian population unless the prevailing circumstances 
do not allow such a warning. Further, parties must take ‘all feasible precautions’ to 
protect those civilian populations under their control from the effects of an attack by 
the opponent. Each party must avoid locating objects that could be considered 
‘legitimate military objectives’ in populated areas. Similarly, the use of human shields 
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Further, there are three broad categories of conflict that are differently regulated under 
IHL, namely international armed conflict between states, non-international armed 
conflicts within states, and occupation, when a State exercises an unconsented-to 
effective control over a territory on which it has no sovereign title. A fourth category 
of relevance is ‘internal disturbance’ when fighting does not meet the threshold of 
non-international armed conflict. Most IHL deals with international armed conflict, 
that is, those between states, even though most contemporary armed conflicts happen 
within states.139 The limited treaty basis to address non-international armed conflict 
under the 1949 Geneva Conventions is reflected in Common Article 3 of the four 
Geneva Conventions, which articulates humanitarian principles applicable to ‘armed 
                                                                                                                                            
to protect certain objects or individuals is prohibited. International Committee of Red 
Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law, rule 97, which is derived in part 
from the IHRL obligation upon states to protect life. 
138 This principle of ‘humanity’ stipulates that civilians and those who are hors de 
combat must be treated humanely: any killing, torture, rape, mutilation, beatings, 
humiliation, and similar abuses are prohibited. In addition, methods or means of 
combat should not cause ‘unnecessary suffering’. The International Court of Justice 
has defined unnecessary suffering as ‘harm greater than that unavoidable to achieve 
legitimate military objectives’. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, paragraph 78. 
139 Tadić (n 135), 489. 
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conflict not of an international character’.140 Common Article 3 contains only the 
most fundamental laws, and is applicable to all parties concerned, including 
insurgency forces. It stipulates that civilians and combatants hors de combat shall ‘be 
treated humanely’, and without discrimination, to preclude inter alia torture, outrages 
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.141 
With the increased concern about armed conflict that are solely or partly internal, 
such as civil wars, Additional Protocol II developed and supplemented common 
Article 3 in respect of armed conflict within a State between its forces and dissident 
forces or other organised armed groups. But, unlike the rest of the Geneva 
Conventions, neither Common Article 3 nor Additional Protocol II has enforcement 
provisions under IHL.142 Additionally, the threshold of application of Protocol II is so 
high that it limits the application of the Protocol to ‘situations at or near the level of 
full-scale civil war’.143 As a result, it is rarely applied in practice. Further, in practice 
                                                 
140  Article 3(1) common to First Geneva Convention (n 43), Second Geneva 
Convention (n 43), Third Geneva Convention (n 43) and Fourth Geneva Convention 
(n 43). 
141 Ibid. Henckaerts, J.M. and Doswald-Beck, L. for the International Committee of 
the Red Cross. (2005). Customary International Humanitarian Law (3 vols.) 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
142  Except, as noted below, ICL removes the international / non-international 
distinction and its enforcement provisions apply regardless, see infra text at n 179-
182. 
143 Protocol II (15), paragraph 79.  
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many governments concerned instead characterise many situations of internal 
violence as ‘internal disturbances’. State authorities indeed have a tendency to deny 
that an armed conflict is taking place on their territory, in an effort to free themselves 
from the limitations imposed by IHL. In the absence of an impartial body to 
authoritatively characterise the conflict, denial of the applicability of IHL is fairly 
common.144 Common Article 3, which does not define ‘armed conflicts not of an 
international character’, leaves a wide margin for governments to contest its 
applicability.145  
Gender critique of IHL has principally addressed the failure of the doctrine to 
articulate how general protections to civilians apply specifically to civilian women, 
beyond a broad commitment to non-discrimination in their application. 146  IHL 
addresses itself inter alia to several aspects of personal safety, access to food, water 
and shelter, health, hygiene and sanitation, education and sources of livelihood.147 It 
further addresses the situation of women in detention and internment,148 and women 
                                                 
144 Jacques, M. (2012). Armed conflict and displacement: the protection of refugees 
and displaced persons under international humanitarian law. Cambridge & NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 72. 
145 United Nations Commission on Human Rights. (1998). Minimum humanitarian 
standards: analytical report of the Secretary-General. 5 January 1998, UN Doc. 
E/CN/4/1998/87, paragraph 74.  
146 See generally Gardam (n 22). 
147 See generally International Committee of the Red Cross (n 33). 
148 Ibid, 153-210. 
 100 
directly involved in hostilities149 (though these latter provisions are less exacting). To 
the extent that there is an obligation on actors to observe IHL without discrimination 
on the basis of gender, women are protected as participants in hostilities, as civilians, 
and as missing or displaced persons or persons in detention.150 In this respect, IHL is 
argued to be more deficient than its parallels in the other regimes under scrutiny, in 
which more fulsome articulation of the women’s gender-specific rights have been 
articulated.  
Further critique focuses on the very particular, and quite problematic, way in which 
gender-specific protections to women have been articulated under IHL. A number of 
specialist protections for women are included throughout the Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocols. The four 1949 Geneva Conventions contain some 19 
provisions that are specifically relevant to women. The scope of these rules is 
somewhat limited and many of them are in fact designed to protect children. Overall, 
the aim of the Conventions is to provide special protection for pregnant women, 
nursing mothers and mothers in general and to address the vulnerability of women to 
sexual violence in times of armed conflict. This is a definition of women’s rights in 
conflict that draws legitimate critique for its narrow boundaries. 
                                                 
149 Ibid, 23-27. 
150 See further Lindsay, C. (2000). Women and War – An Overview’. International 
Review of the Red Cross, 839.  
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To further illustrate, while rape was included within the litany of prohibited acts 
against civilians,151 it is not specifically enumerated as a ‘grave breach’ of the Geneva 
Conventions requiring prosecution. In addition, the offence is articulated as a crime 
against ‘women’s honour’, 152  as distinct from her bodily integrity or autonomy. 
Finally, arguably most problematically, this is the limit of gender-specific protections 
afforded to women under the Geneva Conventions. Against this backdrop, the new 
focus on ‘the fertile and expectant woman’ 153  in the 1977 Additional Protocols 
offered greater, if still limited, promise. The Conference acknowledged that women 
because of their ‘special situation’ had to be given ‘special protection’. Such women 
in a special situation were described as those who ‘were pregnant women, maternity 
cases and women who were in charge of children of less than seven years of age or 
who accompanied them’.154  
Apart from the protection afforded under such articles, which is clearly valuable as far 
as it goes, any indication that the adverse impact of conflict on women might be 
                                                 
151  ‘Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in 
particular against rape, enforced prostitution or any form of indecent assault.’ Fourth 
Geneva Convention (n 43), article 27, paragraph 2, C and Protocol 1 (n 11), articles 
75 and 76. 
152 Ibid.  
153 Ní Aoláin, F. (2000). ‘Sex-based Violence and the Holocaust - A Reevaluation of 
Harms and Rights in International Law.’ Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 12: 43 – 
84, 68-69. 
154 Quoted in ibid.  
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distinctive and encompass wider issues than their roles as mothers and victims of 
sexual violence is not discernible in the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. 
Likewise, in the Additional Protocols, the focus continues to be on protection for 
pregnant women and mothers. In the context of sexual violence, Article 76 of 
Protocol I contains the important comprehensive provision specifically protecting 
women against rape, although this practice is still not designated as a grave breach. 
There is no recognition, either in the travaux préparatoires or in the provisions 
themselves, of the other distinctive problems women face in armed conflict.155 On the 
whole, these gender-specific provisions point to a very circumscribed definition of 
women’s rights in conflict.  
It bears reflection, however, that the articulation of women’s rights in conflict under 
IHL is arguably the most comprehensive of the regimes under scrutiny, in that it 
reaches into many aspects of daily civilian life under conflict and occupation. To 
illustrate, IHL sets out in some detail the rights and entitlements of various categories 
of war victims to humanitarian assistance.156 These rights and entitlements are not 
unique to expectant and lactating mothers, but they are particularly detailed in this 
respect. The Fourth Geneva Convention requires High Contracting Parties to permit 
the free passage of all consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics 
intended for children under the age of fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity 
                                                 
155 Gardam J, (1998). Women, Human Rights and International Humanitarian law. 
International Review of the Red Cross, 324, 421. 
156 See further International Committee of the Red Cross (n 33), 81-82.  
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cases.157 Article 89 requires that interned pregnant and nursing mothers be given 
additional food ‘in proportion to their physiological needs’.158 Further, Additional 
Protocol I provides that, in the distribution of relief consignments, priority must be 
given to children, expectant mothers, maternity cases and nursing mothers.159 In non-
international armed conflicts, the principle of distinction is also applicable and 
Additional Protocol II reiterates the prohibition on the starvation of the civilian 
population as a method of warfare.160 Further, denial of food or of access to food to 
persons hors de combat is a violation of the principle of humane treatment laid down 
in Common Article 3. In addition, Common Article 3 entitles impartial humanitarian 
organisations to offer their services to the parties to the conflict, an offer which cannot 
be arbitrarily declined. Also, the Fourth Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol I 
lay down a series of provisions dealing with collective and individual relief supplies 
for civilians in occupied territories.161 
Nevertheless, the ‘limited and pragmatic’ objectives of IHL, namely ‘to limit 
suffering during times of armed conflict, not to redress social inequalities or assist in 
                                                 
157 Fourth Geneva Convention (n 43), article 23. 
158 Ibid, article 89.  
159 Protocol 1 (n 11), article 70(1).  
160 Protocol II (n 150), article 14.  
161 Fourth Geneva Convention (n 43), article 55. The basic rule is that the Occupying 
Power has the duty to provide food and medical supplies for the population and that it 
should bring the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles into the 
occupied territory if the resources of that territory are inadequate. 
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rebuilding post-conflict communities’162 remains a key line of feminist critique of the 
underpinning definition of women’s rights. 163  This specificity of rights of 
humanitarian organisations to access civilian populations are illustrative of the detail 
provided in IHL, involving implicit definitions of women’s rights in conflict that 
address the right to food, that find no effective parallel under the other regimes of 
relevance. As has been well-documented, access to food in periods of conflict is 
fundamentally gendered, because women’s reproductive roles makes them more 
vulnerable to food shortages. Women of childbearing age typically need more 
vitamins and minerals, while pregnant and lactating mothers have specific nutritional 
requirements linked to their own and their children’s survival. Moreover, certain 
health deficiencies (iron, protein, iodine) all affect women more than men.164 The 
focus of scholarly critique on the problematic gender essentialism of IHL has 
arguably distracted from the potentially more fruitful focus on the specific protections 
afforded to civilians, including women, and how improved compliance might be 
achieved. 
In terms of the regime’s definition of sexual violence, critics argue that IHL does not 
prohibit sexual violence in a sufficiently robust manner, leaving the prohibition 
                                                 
162 Durham, H. (2002). Review of 'Women, Armed Conflict and International Law'. 
International Review of the Red Cross, 84, 655-659, 657. 
163 For an effective overview of this debate, see Oosterveld, V. (2009). ‘Feminist 
Debates on Civilian Women and International Humanitarian Law.’ Windsor Yearbook 
of Access to Justice 27: 385-402. 
164 International Committee of the Red Cross (n 33), 77-78.  
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largely implied, rather than explicit. 165  Broadly speaking, rape is expressly 
prohibited,166 while the prohibition of other forms of sexual violence is encompassed 
in less explicit provisions such as the prohibitions against cruel treatment and torture, 
outrages upon personal dignity, indecent assault and enforced prostitution, and those 
intended to ensure respect for persons and honour.167 In contemporary IHL treaties, 
rape and other forms of sexual violence are prohibited in both international and non-
international armed conflicts. In international armed conflicts, the Third Geneva 
Convention of 1949 continues to provide that prisoners of war are ‘in all 
circumstances entitled to respect for their persons and honour’ and that ‘women shall 
be treated with all regard due to their sex’.168 The Fourth Geneva Convention is more 
explicit and provides that civilian ‘women shall be especially protected against any 
                                                 
165 See, for example, Gardam (n 155).   
166 As early as the Lieber Code of 1863, article 44 providing that:  
All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country… all 
rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited under 
the penalty of death, or such other such severe punishment as may seem 
adequate for the gravity of the offense. A soldier, officer or private, in the act 
of committing such violence, and disobeying a superior ordering hum to 
abstain from it, may be lawfully killed on the spot by such behavior.  
167  Gaggioli, G. (2014). Sexual violence in armed conflicts: A violation of 
international humanitarian law and human rights law. International Review of the Red 
Cross, 96(894), 503-538, 511-517. 
168 Third Geneva Convention (n 43), article 14. 
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attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of 
indecent assault’. 169  Additional Protocol I provides that ‘outrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution and 
any form of indecent assault’, are ‘prohibited at any time and in any place 
whatsoever, whether committed by civilian or by military agents’.170 Two additional 
provisions protect specifically women ‘against rape, enforced prostitution and any 
other form of indecent assault’ 171  and children ‘against any form of indecent 
assault’.172 
Common Article 3 implicitly also prohibits sexual violence when it outlaws ‘violence 
to life and person, in particular … mutilation, cruel treatment and torture’ as well as 
‘outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment’. It 
is complemented by Additional Protocol II, which, where/when applicable, prohibits, 
in the provision on fundamental guarantees, ‘outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any 
form of indecent assault’ for civilians and persons hors de combat.173 This is the first 
IHL provision explicitly prohibiting rape without distinction between women and 
                                                 
169 Fourth Geneva Convention (n 43), article 27. 
170 Protocol 1 (n 11), article 75(2)(b). 
171 Ibid, article 76(1) 
172 Ibid, article 77(1). 
173 Protocol II (n 15), article 4(2)(e). 
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men. Customary IHL also prohibits rape and other forms of sexual violence. 174 
According to the ICRC Customary Law Study, this prohibition has been found to 
apply both in international and non-international armed conflicts and protects women, 
girls, boys and men.175 
In addition to establishing the presence of conflict, and the occurrence of sexual 
violence, a further critical element is required to amount to a violation of IHL. Even 
when committed in times of armed conflict, sexual violence is not necessarily an IHL 
violation. The term ‘conflict-related sexual violence’ is not used in IHL treaties and – 
to quote Gagglioli – ‘is not properly legal’.176 Rather, the term conflict ‘nexus’ is used 
in IHL. This is a complex area, in which there has been significant (and ongoing) 
jurisprudential development.177 Sufficed to explain for the purpose of the chapter by 
means of the following example: 
In the context of a non-international armed conflict, if a military commander 
rapes a subordinate soldier in a military barracks as a form of punishment – as 
he may have done already in peacetime – without this act having any link to 
the armed conflict situation, IHL would not apply to the act. On the other 
                                                 
174 International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary IHL Database, Rule 93, 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule93.  
175 Ibid. 
176 Gaggioli (n 167), 513. 
177 For an overview, see van der Wilt, H. (2012). War Crimes and the Requirement of 
a Nexus with an Armed Conflict. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 10(5), 
1113–1128. 
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hand, in the same armed conflict, if the military commander rapes a person 
detained for reasons connected to the armed conflict, such an act clearly 
constitutes a violation of IHL (and human rights law). The nexus derives from 
a number of elements here: the identity of the perpetrator (a military 
commander), the identity of the victim (a person detained for reasons related 
to the armed conflict), and the context (situation of vulnerability of detainees 
to the Detaining Power).178 
These apparently restrictive definitions of conflict, women’s rights and sexual 
violence in conflict further ground broad feminist disengagement from IHL.  
 
International Criminal Law 
ICL has offered considerable promise to feminists in the definition of conflict in one 
important respect, that bring the law closer to women’s lived experience: ICL has all 
but abandoned the distinction between international and non-international armed 
conflicts. (In practical terms, given the absence of enforcement provisions attached to 
Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, this is especially significant from an 
enforcement perspective.) In Tadić, the ICTY ruled that it had, albeit by implication, 
jurisdiction over Common Article 3 crimes.179 Its sister court, the ICTR, had express 
jurisdiction over breaches of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II;180 and the 
ICC has jurisdiction over crimes committed during a non-international armed 
                                                 
178 Gagglioli (n 167), 515.  
179 Tadić (n 135), paragraphs 97-98, 117, 119-125. 
180 ICTR Statute (n 48), article 4. 
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conflict.181 The ICTY decision suggests that the customary law on non-international 
armed conflicts is essentially the same as for international armed conflicts. The Tadić 
case and the 2005 ICRC study have determined that under customary international 
law, the IHL rules on international and non-international armed conflicts are in 
essence much the same, and according to the ICRC study the majority of IHL rules 
(though not all) apply to both types of conflict.182 The ICC Statute has also been 
instrumental in this regard. So, the sensible course for a force commander is to treat 
any military operation as if it is an international armed conflict, and to approach 
women’s rights accordingly. 
Indeed, ICL can apply even in the absence of armed conflict. While prosecution for 
war crimes requires the presence of armed conflict,183 there is no such requirement for 
the prosecution of crimes against humanity. Therefore certain violations of women’s 
rights will only fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction if committed in the context of a 
‘widespread or systematic attach directed against any civilian population’,184 but the 
presence of conflict per se is not required.185 Likewise, in order to establish individual 
                                                 
181 Rome Statute (n 43), article 8(2)(c). 
182  Tadić (n 135), paragraphs 97-98, 117, 119-125. For an assessment of these 
findings, see C. Greenwood, ‘International humanitarian law and the Tadić case,’ 
European Journal of International Law, Vol. 7, 1996, 265.  
183 Rome Statute (n 43), article 8. 
184 See further Akayesu (n 56), paragraph 580.  
185 In addition, the Rome Statute includes persecution on the grounds of gender as 
constitutive of crimes against humanity. According to Moshan:  
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criminal responsibility for genocide, the constitutive acts must have been conducted 
with the specific intent to destroy an ethnic, racial, religious or national group, but 
there is no requirement for the presence of conflict.186 
The failure of the post World War II Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals established by 
Allied Powers, within an emerging regime of ICL, to prosecute crimes of sexual 
violence is a matter of historical record. 187  Established with limited heads of 
jurisdiction and to pursue prosecution for the most serious of crimes against peace, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity,188 sexual violence as a gendered harm was 
consigned to either privacy or ‘less serious’ domain of impunity. The failure to 
                                                                                                                                            
The inclusion of gender-based persecution as a crime against humanity adds 
validity to the concept of gender-based crimes. In addition, this inclusion may 
prove helpful in the prosecution of war criminals who rape or otherwise 
violate women as an expression of their misogynism, rather than as a means of 
persecuting a particular ethnic or religious group. 
Moshan, B. S. (1998). Women, War, and Words: The Gender Component in the 
Permanent International Criminal Court's Definition of Crimes against Humanity. 
Fordham International Law Journal, 22, 154. 182. 
186 Rome Statute (n 43), article 6.  
187 See further Ní Aoláin (n 153). 
188  Charter Annexed to the Agreement for the Establishment of an International 
Military Tribunal, 8 August 1945, 5 UNTS 15; Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East, Special proclamation by the Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers at Tokyo, 19 January 1946.  
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criminalise and prosecute gender and sexual-based crimes at Nuremberg and Tokyo 
cast a long shadow over prospects for gender justice in ICL. However, the stark 
revelations of the extent of sexual violence in the early 1990s Balkans conflict and 
Rwandan genocide coincided with the development and codification of ICL as a 
regime of international law. The coincidence of concerted feminist activism and a 
new dynamic period in the evolution of ICL quickly recorded its impact on the 
practice and priorities of the ad hoc Tribunals established by the UNSC for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.   
Due to both the inauspicious starting point, and the highly dynamic nature of ICL in 
the 1990s, it is these set of developments on women’s rights that are most difficult to 
capture succinctly. Further, the pace of development continues to be rapid, as the ICC 
has finally turned its attention in a more concerted manner to the prosecution of harms 
against women. As this short overview will reveal, while there have been 
considerable advances in the prosecution of gender harm, the underpinning definition 
of women’s rights remains closely moored to questions of physical and sexual 
personhood. The potential in the Rome Statute to advance a definition of women’s 
rights that encompasses economic and social rights is, to date, significantly under-
developed.189  
                                                 
189 See further Schmid. E. (2015). Taking Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
Seriously in International Criminal Law Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, discussion of gender implications, 33-34. 
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Historically, while it has long been accepted that crimes of sexual violence are 
contrary to the laws of war 190  and customary international law, the foundational 
statutes remained silent on the status of rape as a war crime or a constitutive act of 
crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, the early jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals 
for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia determined these questions definitively. As 
noted, in a series of landmark judicial developments of ICL, rape was held to 
constitute a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, 191  constitutive of a crime 
against humanity192 and genocide.193 The Rome Statute codified these developments 
and went beyond them by explicitly recognizing rape, sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, pregnancy and sterilization and other forms of sexual violence as crimes 
against humanity and as war crimes. 194  Unlike the Nuremberg Charter and the 
Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals, which limited persecution as a crime against 
                                                 
190 Chinkin, C. (2009). Gender-related Violence and International Criminal Law and 
Jurisprudence. In A. Cassese (Ed.), Oxford Companion to International Criminal 
Justice (pp. 75-81). Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, page 76, 
confirmed by Delalic and others (IT-96-21) TJ 16 November 1998, paragraph 145.  
191 Tadic (n 54). 
192 ICTY Statute (n 49), article 5(g); ICTR Statute (n 48); Rome Statute (n 43), 
article 8; SCSL Statute (n 45), article 2(g). 
193 See infra text at nn 54-56. 
194 Rome Statute (n 43), article 7 and 8.  
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humanity to political, racial and religious grounds, the Rome Statute includes 
persecution on gender grounds within this rubric.195  
Away from the drama and intrigue of the ICC, some ostensibly more progressive 
developments regarding the definition of women’s rights have been advanced. Of 
note, in particular, is the forced marriage jurisprudence of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, a hybrid court with elements of domestic and international jurisdiction.196 The 
Prosecutor argued that the ‘bush wife’ phenomenon – the capture of women who were 
then ‘married’, forced to have sex with their abductor and to bear their children – was 
not adequately captured by offences such as rape or enslavement. Subsequent 
indictments included forced marriage as a crime against humanity197 (under the rubric 
of ‘other inhumane acts’ 198 ), evidencing ongoing efforts to capture more fully 
women’s experiences in armed conflict and genocide within existing offences.199  
A more nuanced and potentially more comprehensive approach to women’s rights is 
articulated in the 2014 Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-based Crimes from the 
                                                 
195 Rome Statute (n 43), article 7(1)(h). 
196 See further Gekker, E. (2014). Rape, Sexual Slavery, and Forced Marriage at the 
International Criminal Court: How Katanga Utilizes a Ten-Year-Old Rule but 
Overlooks New Jurisprudence. Hastings Women's Law Journal (Winter), 105-133. 
197 Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Further 
Amended Consolidated Indictment, 18 February 2005. 
198 SCSL Statute (n 45), article 2(i).  
199 See further Chinkin (n 190), 78.  
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ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP). The document, in line with the preceding 
jurisprudence, focuses also on ending impunity for sexual crimes and ensuring that 
such acts are charged as forms of other violence within the competence of the Court 
where the material elements are met, for example, charging rape as torture.200 While 
the document notes that not all gender crimes manifest as forms of sexual violence,201 
the document is in practice dedicated to improving institutional commitment and 
capacity for the prosecution of crimes involving sexual violence. The Policy Paper is 
justly celebrated for operating to a more nuanced construction of gender than the one 
defined in the Rome Statute, namely: 
For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term ‘gender’ refers to 
the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term 
‘gender’ does not indicate any meaning different from the above.202 
Instead, the Policy Paper addressed gender as constructed, non-binary and implicating 
sexual orientation.203 It is, nevertheless, limited by the broader failure of the Statute 
and ICL to ‘tak[e] economic, social and cultural rights seriously’. The disappointing 
failures of the Court to meaningfully discharge its reparations mandate to date is 
                                                 
200 International Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor (2014). Policy Paper on 
Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes. The Hague: ICC, 6.  
201 Ibid, 16.  
202 Rome Statute (n 43), article 7(3).  
203 Oosterveld, V. (2014). Constructive Ambiguity and the Meaning of ‘Gender’ for 
the International Criminal Court. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 16(4), 
563-580. 
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further evidence of this broader failing to address the adverse impact of conflict on 
women’s social and economic rights.204  
Due to its focus on individual criminal prosecution, the definition of rape under ICL 
must include a clear and specific articulation of the crime’s objective (actus reus) 
elements. A full description of the evolution of the relevant jurisprudence is beyond 
the scope of the chapter, however the ICC Elements of Crimes integrate case-law 
evolutions and provide a definition of rape that is generally accepted by the 
                                                 
204 Chappell, L. (2017). The gender injustice cascade: ‘transformative’ reparations 
for victims of sexual and gender-based crimes in the Lubanga case at the International 
Criminal Court. International Journal of Human Rights. 
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international community as the most authoritative such definition.205 This definition 
requires inter alia ‘penetration, however slight’ of the victim or perpetrator, 
committed ‘by force, or by threat of force or coercion… or by taking advantage of a 
coercive environment’. 206  The definition thus involves physical and contextual 
elements.  
                                                 
205 For instance, the World Health Organization (WHO) relies on this definition, see 
WHO (Eds.). Krug, E.G., Dahlberg L.L., Mercy, J.A., Zwi, A.B. and Lozano, R. 
(2002). World Report on Violence and Health. Geneva: World Health Organization 
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/42495/9241545615_eng.pdf;jsessioni
d=0F7CE8CC1EB4AE86B40025DF0BCC69A7?sequence=1. In addition, a number 
of national legislations have been adopted or modified to include the crime of rape 
and other sexual crimes as defined by the ICC. See the national legislations of 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Georgia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, South 
Africa and the United Kingdom, International Committee of the Red Cross, IHL 
Customary Law Database, Rule 93, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule93. See also, e.g., Weiner, P. (2013). The Evolving 
Jurisprudence of the Crime of Rape in International Criminal Law. Boston College 
Law Review 54(3), 1207-1237, 1218, cited in Gaggiolo (n 167), 509. 
206  International Criminal Court. (2011). Elements of Crimes. The Hague, article 
8(2)(b)(xxii): 
1. The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in 
penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the 
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The definition of sexual violence more broadly under ICL is relatively inclusive. In 
the Akayesu case, the ICTR Trial Chamber held that sexual violence is ‘any act of a 
sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are 
coercive’.207  The term ‘act of a sexual nature’ is very broad. It may range from 
penetration to comments having a sexual connotation. ‘Coercion’ moreover must be 
understood broadly as including not only a show of physical force but also ‘[t]hreats, 
intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or 
desperation’.208 The Trial Chamber further held that ‘sexual violence is not limited to 
a physical invasion of the human body and may include acts which do not involve 
penetration or even physical contact’.209 From this definition, it is clear that sexual 
                                                                                                                                            
perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim 
with any object or any other part of the body.  
2. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, 
such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological 
oppression or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by 
taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed 
against a person incapable of giving genuine consent. 
207 Akayesu (n 56), paragraph 688; Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, ICTR, Case No. 
ICTR-96-13, Judgment (Trial Chamber), 27 January 2000, paragraph 965. 
208 Ibid.  
209 Akayesu (n 56), paragraph 688. 
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violence encompasses and is broader than rape, but a minimum threshold of gravity to 
consider an act as ‘sexual violence’ is not immediately clear.210  
The Rome Statute criminalizes ‘sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity’.211 This is a non-exhaustive list of the most serious forms of sexual violence 
falling under the jurisdiction of the ICC, which does not help to define the minimum 
gravity threshold for an act to be considered ‘sexual violence’. Gaggioli provides a 
helpful overview of additional concrete examples of sexual violence drawn from case 
law and legal writings: for instance, trafficking for sexual exploitation,212 mutilation 
of sexual organs,213 sexual exploitation (such as obtaining sexual services in return for 
                                                 
210 Gaggioli (n 167), 506. 
211 Rome Statute (n 43), articles 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi) (emphasis added). 
212 See Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2000, 2237 UNTS 319, article 3.  
213  Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-96-7, Judgment (Trial 
Chamber), 18 December 2008, paragraph 976. 
 119 
food or protection),214 forced abortions,215 enforced contraception,216 sexual assault,217 
forced marriage,218 sexual harassment (such as forced stripping),219 forced inspections 
for virginity220 and forced public nudity have been qualified as sexual violence.221 
ICL requires a conflict-nexus in order to establish that a war crime has occurred. The 
question of conflict nexus has been extensively litigated, but is defined to broad 
acceptance by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Kunarac case. The Appeals 
Chamber confirmed that what distinguishes a war crime from, for example, a purely 
                                                 
214 Bastick, M., Grimm, K. and Kunz, R. (2007). Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: 
Global Overview and Implications for the Security Sector. Geneva: Geneva Centre for 
the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 19; See also WHO (n 205). 
215 Ibid, 19; WHO (n 205), 149. 
216 Ibid. 
217  See Fourth Geneva Convention (n 43), article 27; Protocol 1 (n 11), article 
75(2)(b); Protocol II (n 15), article (4)(2)(e); Rome Statute (n 43), article 8(2)(e)(vi); 
ICTR Statute (n 48), article 4(e); SCSL Statute (n 45), article 3(e); and UN 
Transitional Administration in East Timor, Regulation No. 2000/15, Section 
6.1(e)(vi). 
218 Bastick et al (n 214), 49; WHO (n 205), 149. 
219 Akayesu (n 56), paragraph 693. 
220 Bastick et al (n 214), 19; WHO (n 205), 150. 
221 Akayesu (n 56), paragraph 688; Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac and Others, 
Case No. IT-96-23&23/1 (Trial Chamber), 22 February 2001, paragraphs 766–774. 
 120 
domestic criminal offence is the armed conflict ‘environment’ in which it is 
committed. The conflict must been important to the perpetrator’s ‘ability’, ‘decision’, 
‘manner’ or ‘purpose’ to commit the crime. Ultimately, if the perpetrator ‘acted in 
furtherance of or under the guise of the armed conflict’, that would establish the 
necessary nexus.222 The Appeals Chamber went on to identify a number of factors 
determine whether or not an alleged offence is sufficiently related to the armed 
conflict to constitute a war crime. These factors included:  
the fact that the perpetrator is a combatant; the fact that the victim is a non-
combatant; the fact that the victim is a member of the opposing party; the fact 
that the act may be said to serve the ultimate goal of a military campaign; and 
the crime is committed as part of or in the context of the perpetrator’s official 
duties.223  
Along the lines of the ad hoc tribunal case law, the ICC Elements of Crimes provide 
that for a war crime to exist, it must be committed ‘in the context of and associated 
with’ an armed conflict.224 The wording ‘in the context of’ refers to the existence of 
an armed conflict, and ‘associated with’ refers to the nexus requirement. Conflict-
related sexual violence must thus be committed by a person (whether combatant or 
civilian) in the context of and associated with an armed conflict in order to amount to 
a war crime under the Rome Statute. Ultimately, the determination is made on a case-
                                                 
222 Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac and Others, ICTY Case No. IT-96-23&23/1 
(Appeals Chamber), 12 June 2002, paragraph 58. 
223 Ibid, paragraph 59. 
224 See, for instance, International Criminal Court (n 206), article 8(2)(a)(i)-1. 
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by-case basis. It is clear that this conflict nexus requirement mitigates against the 
broad definition of ‘conflict-related sexual violence’ now prominent in relevant 
policy-making and advocated in much feminist literature. 225  Indeed, this conflict 
nexus requirement has been a key line of feminist critique in ICL.226 
 
International Human Rights Law 
There are a number of potential ways in which conflict may be defined under IHRL. 
While the traditional position was that IHRL applied in peacetime and IHL in armed 
conflict, it is now widely recognised that IHRL continues to apply in amended form in 
armed conflict.227 Rather, human rights treaty obligations continue, except in so far as 
                                                 
225 For a discussion of relevant literature, see Swaine, A. (2015). Beyond Strategic 
Rape and Between the Public and Private: Violence Against Women in Armed 
Conflict. Human Rights Quarterly 37(3), 755 – 786.  
226 For overview, see O'Rourke, C. (2013). International Law and Domestic Gender 
Justice: Why Case Studies Matter. In M. Fineman & E. Zinstag (Eds.), Feminist 
Perspectives on Transitional Justice (pp. 11-41). Antwerp: Intersentia. 
227 For example, the Human Rights Committee has been clear that the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights applies also in situations of armed conflict to 
which the rules of IHL are applicable, Human Rights Committee. (2001). General 
Comment 29, States of Emergency (article 4), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 
and Human Rights Committee. (2004). General Comment 31, Nature of the General 
Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant. UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13. See generally United Nations Office of the High 
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the more specialist obligations, or lex specialis, of IHL applies. The relationship 
between IHL and IHRL is more appropriately explored in Chapter 3. Suffice to say, in 
determining when the lex specialis applies, IHRL defers to IHL’s definition of 
conflict.  
The further definition of conflict under IHRL relies on the system of derogations.  
IHRL permits states to derogate from certain obligations in times of ‘public 
emergency’ (though the right to life, freedom from torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment, slavery, arbitrary detention and freedom of thought are non-derogable). 
States exercising this authority to derogate certain civil and political rights are thus 
known as ‘states of emergency’.228 To reach the threshold of ‘public emergency’, the 
situation must ‘threat[en] the life of the nation’.229 Interestingly, however, the Human 
Rights Committee has made clear that the presence of an armed conflict, whether 
internal or international, does not necessarily imply that the threshold has been 
reached for the state to derogate from its human rights obligations.230 Thus, ‘public 
emergency’ and conflict are not synonyms under IHRL. Even the state in armed 
                                                                                                                                            
Commissioner for Human Rights (2011). International Legal Protections of Human 
Rights in Armed Conflict. New York and Geneva. 
228 See further Gross, O., & Ní Aoláin, F. (2006). Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency 
Powers in Theory and in Practice. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge and New 
York. 
229 ICCPR (n 71), article 4.1; Human Rights Committee (n 227); Lawless v Ireland 
(No.1), ECtHR, Application No. 332/57, 1960.   
230 Human Rights Committee (n 227), paragraph 3. 
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conflict must justify derogations on the basis that the conflict threatens the life of the 
nation.  
Also relevant to this discussion are the limitations on the economic, social and 
cultural rights permitted under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. 231  Unlike derogations, there is no requirement for a ‘public 
emergency’ in order for state parties to impose limitations on rights guaranteed under 
Covenant. Thus, while conflict may activate such limitations, it is not a pre-requisite. 
Instead, limitation clauses apply across the spectrum, from everyday public order 
maintenance and policing strategies to national security and large-scale military 
actions. Importantly, limitations are permitted on one ground alone, namely that they 
advance the general welfare of the population. Further, the travaux preparatoires on 
the Covenant’s limitations clause makes clear that that no limitations for reasons of 
public order, public morals or the respect for rights and freedoms of others should be 
                                                 
231 ICESCR (n 72), article 4: The States parties to the present Covenant recognize 
that, in the enjoyment of those rights proscribed by the State in conformity with the 
present Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to such limitations as are 
determined by law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these 
rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic 
society.  
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permitted.232  Limitation clauses are included in various rights provisions such as 
article 14 (access of the press and public to criminal trials), article 12 (freedom of 
movement) and article 22 (freedom of association). These latter limitation clauses are 
phrased in terms of permitting those restrictions that ‘are necessary in a democratic 
society’.233  
The CEDAW treaty text includes neither an explicit nor implicit definition of conflict. 
CEDAW does not specify its application to armed conflict—in contrast, for example, 
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.234 Neither do its provisions expressly 
address the needs and rights of women that prevail in conflict-affected settings. 
Further, CEDAW does not permit derogations.235 Looking to CEDAW Committee 
practice, the Committee has continued to scrutinise treaty-compliance of state parties 
affected by conflict.236 Arguably, therefore, the Convention and Committee neither 
                                                 
232 Summary Record of the 234th meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 
2 July 1951, E/CN.4/SR.234 at 23. Similar. See further Müller, A. (2009). Limitations 
and Derogations to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Human Rights Law Review 
9(4), 557-601.  
233 ICCPR (n 71), articles 12, 14, and 22.  
234 CRC (n 74), article 38.  
235 See generally O'Rourke, C., & Swaine, A. (2018). CEDAW and the UN Security 
Council Women, Peace and Security Resolutions: Advancing Accountability for 
Women's Rights in Conflict. International and Comparative Law Quarterly 67(1), 
167-199. 
236 For an overview, see further ibid.  
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include nor require a definition of conflict. Nevertheless, in GR30, the Committee 
made clear its definition of conflict – a notably broad one – that includes but goes 
beyond IHL definitions of conflict, occupation and internal disturbance, as well as 
human rights law definitions of public emergency:  
The general recommendation covers the application of the Convention to 
conflict prevention, international and non-international armed conflicts, 
situations of foreign occupation, as well as other forms of occupation and the 
post-conflict phase. In addition, the recommendation covers other situations of 
concern, such as internal disturbances, protracted and low-intensity civil strife, 
political strife, ethnic and communal violence, states of emergency and 
suppression of mass uprisings, war against terrorism and organized crime, that 
may not necessarily be classified as armed conflict under IHL and which 
result in serious violations of women’s rights and are of particular concern to 
the Committee.237 
Human rights treaty bodies are typically motivated to define conflict restrictively, in 
order to ensure the continuing application of treaty obligations to the greatest extent 
possible. By contrast, the CEDAW Committee offers a broad definition of conflict in 
GR30. The Committee thereby makes clear that all CEDAW obligations continue to 
apply in these circumstances. Further, the broad definition is appropriate because all 
                                                 
237 Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
(2013). General Recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict 
and post-conflict situations. UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/30, paragraph 4. 
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of these various manifestations of conflict adversely impact women’s rights, 
irrespective of conflict intensity.    
In order to understand the definition of women’s rights in conflict under IHRL, it is 
first important to understand the hierarchy of rights in the canon. First and foremost, 
some rights are recognized as having a special status as peremptory norms of 
customary international law (jus cogens), which means that no derogation is 
admissible under any circumstance, including conflict. These rights prevail over other 
international obligations and include the prohibitions of torture, slavery, genocide, 
racial discrimination and crimes against humanity, and the right to self-determination. 
These rights are widely recognized as peremptory norms. 238  It is therefore not 
possible to reserve, limit or derogate from these jus cogens rights, even in times of 
armed conflict. Foundational feminist critique of jus cogens challenges the supposed 
universality of concept, for example, in singling out racial but not also gender 
discrimination.239 Moreover, the condemnation of exclusively civil and political rights 
violations underpins further feminist critique.240 
Second, feminist scholarship has identified a gender hierarchy within IHRL, in terms 
of differential status afforded to so-called ‘first generation’ civil and political rights 
                                                 
238  International Law Commission. (2001). Report of the International Law 
Commission on the work of its fifty-third session (23 April - 1 June and 2 July - 10 
August 2001). UN Doc. A/56/10, Part 1, Ch.5, 84. 
239 See, paradigmatically, Charlesworth, H. and C. Chinkin (1993). ‘The Gender of 
Jus Cogens.’ Human Rights Quarterly 15: 63 - 76. 
240 Ibid.  
 127 
and ‘second generation’ economic, social and cultural rights.241 This gender hierarchy 
is further compounded by a gender disaggregation of human life between ‘private 
sphere’ activities of family and home, free from state interference, and ‘public sphere’ 
domain in which the citizen is entitled to make demands of the state. While 
protections and obligations may formally apply without discrimination on the basis of 
gender, it is in practice women who spend most of their lives in the private sphere and 
men who predominate in the public sphere. The development of the due diligence 
doctrine in the early 1990s transformed the regime of IHRL in its applicability to the 
lives and rights of women, by imposing state liability for violations perpetrated by 
non-state actors.242 This is a hierarchy that becomes even more pronounced in times 
of conflict, due to differential protection afforded to non-derogable civil and political 
rights vis-à-vis economic, social and cultural rights, which are subject to broad 
limitations.  
                                                 
241 Charlesworth and Chinkin (n 4), 231-240. 
242 Principle established in Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras, (Ser. C) No. 4 (1988) 
IACHR, Judgment, 29 July 1988. For its modern application to women’s rights, see 
further Byrnes, A. and Bath E. (2008). ‘Violence Against Women, the Obligation of 
Due Diligence, and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women - Recent Developments.’ Human Rights 
Law Review 8: 517. 
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These are hierarchies that the CEDAW Committee has attempted to address 
throughout its activities, in particular in respect of conflict through GR30.243 The 
Committee has therefore advanced a broader and more inclusive definition of 
women’s rights in conflict than can be found elsewhere under IHRL. The bulk of the 
General Recommendation is dedicated to articulating the ways in which the rights 
guaranteed under CEDAW are impacted by conflict, specifically the prohibition of 
discrimination in law, policy and custom;244 the obligation on states to challenge 
discriminatory social and cultural patterns;245 the prohibition on trafficking;246  the 
right to political participation in domestic and international affairs; 247  access to 
education, employment, health; 248  and the rights of rural women; 249  right to 
                                                 
243  Pramilla Patten statement to ‘Arria Formula Meeting on linkages between 
Security Council on Resolution 1325 and CEDAW GR 30’, 5 December 2016, New 
York, United Nations.  
244 Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (n 
237), paragraphs 10, 34-37; 53-56; 58-60.  
245 Ibid, paragraph 34-37. 
246 Ibid, paragraph 39-40. 
247 Ibid, paragraphs 42-46, 70-72. 
248 Ibid, paragraphs 48-51. 
249 Ibid. 
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nationality;250 right to equality in marriage and family relations;251 and the right to 
enter into contracts.252 GR30 notes the consequent obligations on states to remedy 
violations caused by conflict and makes several recommendations to states parties to 
this end.253 In practice, due to its pluralist nature, diverse definitions of women’s 
rights prevail under IHRL. 
The so-called ‘mainstream’ international human rights system is now a site of 
considerable success in terms of feminist engagement and the broad affirmation of 
women’s rights. These successes are most pronounced in respect of violence against 
women, which the HRC, CERD and CESCR have all made important progress in 
recognising as a violation of treaty obligations under their mandate.254 Further, the 
                                                 
250 Ibid, paragraphs 58-60. 
251 Ibid, paragraphs 62-64. 
252 Ibid, paragraphs 74-80.  
253 Ibid, paragraphs 12, 17, 24, 28, 33, 38, 41, 46, 52, 57, 61, 65, 69, 73, 81, 82-86.  
254 Human Rights Committee. (2000). General Comment No. 28: Equality of Rights 
Between Men and Women (Article 3). UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10, paragraph 
11; Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination. (2000). General 
Recommendation No. XXV: Gender-Related Dimensions of Racial Discrimination. 
UN Doc. HRI/ GEN/1/Rev.7; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
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E/C.12/2005/4, paragraph 27. See generally Edwards, A. (2011). Violence Against 
Women under International Human Rights Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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mainstream human rights system has arguably gone further than the CEDAW 
Committee in robustly articulating women’s reproductive rights.255 Nevertheless, the 
impact of conflict on these rights and obligations is broadly under-articulated within 
the mainstream human rights system. In its treatment of conflict, the mainstream 
human rights system has instead concentrated its activity on the issue of derogations. 
Thus, the practice of derogations and limitations, their scope and operation, has 
largely proceeded without meaningful reflection as to its gendered implications and 
the resulting definition of women’s rights in conflict.  
In terms of the regime’s definition of sexual violence, most human rights treaties, 
universal and regional, do not contain explicit reference to sexual violence. 256 
Moreover, even those that do reference sexual violence lack a clear definition of the 
phenomenon. 257  Further, even the influential CEDAW Committee General 
                                                 
255  See generally Zampas and Gher (n 97); see specifically K.L. v. Peru, HRC, 
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article 19(1) and 34.  
257 See, for example, Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, 11 May 2011, 3011 UNTS Reg No 
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Recommendation Number 19 on Violence Against Women nowhere uses the term 
‘sexual violence’; rather it refers to sexual assault (including in wars, paragraph 16), 
sexual harassment (with reference to discrimination in the workplace), sexual abuse 
(within families) and sexual exploitation (with reference to article 6).258 This apparent 
silence on the definition of sexual violence reflects the CEDAW-led human rights 
approach, which defines first ‘gender-based violence against women’ as ‘violence that 
is directed against a women because she is a women or that affects women 
disproportionately’. 259  CEDAW further categorises gender-based violence against 
women not primarily by forms (or manifestations), but by the sites in which they take 
place, namely violence in the family, violence in the community and violence 
perpetrated or condoned by state agents.260 (This is an approach to definition adopted 
also by the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women. 261 ) As sexual 
                                                                                                                                            
52313; Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of 
Violence against Women, 9 June 1994, 33 ILM 960; Protocol to the African Charter 
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260 See further Freeman et al (n 93), 443-474. 
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violence occurs across all three sites, an encompassing definition of specifically 
‘sexual’ violence is not apparent from the Committee’s activities. In its General 
Recommendation Number 35, which updates General Recommendation Number 19 
on Violence Against Women, the Committee does stipulate that States must ‘[e]nsure 
that sexual assault, including rape is characterised as a crime against women’s right to 
personal security and their physical, sexual and psychological integrity’.262  Thus, 
while the Committee offers a definition of how the crime should be framed in law, it 
does not offer an explicit definition of the elements of the violation itself.  
IHRL is arguably unique in its definition of sexual violence by expressly articulating 
a relationship between sexual violence against women and broader gender inequality. 
This articulation took some time to emerge. Indeed, the CEDAW Convention is 
                                                                                                                                            
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika 
Coomaraswamy, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 
1994/45. UN Economic and Social Council. UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/42. 
262 Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. 
(2017). General Recommendation No. 35 on gender-based violence against women, 
updating general recommendation No. 19. UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/35, paragraph 33. 
The paragraph continues:  
Ensure that the definition of sexual crimes, including marital and acquaintance/date 
rape is based on lack of freely given consent, and takes account of coercive 
circumstances. Any time limitations, where they exist, should prioritise the interests 
of the victims/survivors and give consideration to circumstances hindering their 
capacity to report the violence suffered to competent services/authorities. 
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formally silent on the issue of violence against women. Nevertheless, the CEDAW 
Committee’s General Recommendation Number 19 was foundational in articulating 
this relationship between violence against women (including sexual violence) and 
gender discrimination on a number of grounds: first, by identifying that much 
violence was directed against women because of her gender;263 second, that particular 
forms of violence affected women disproportionately, both in their impact and 
scale;264 third, that there were patterns of state complicity and inactivity in addressing 
certain forms of violence that disproportionately impacted women; 265  fourth, that 
violence against women had an important role in making women unequal by 
preventing their access to rights;266 and, finally, that violence against women had a 
critical role in maintaining women’s inequality. 267   The CEDAW Committee’s 
approach has enjoyed a good deal of uptake within the other human rights treaty-
bodies,268 and thus broad penetration within IHRL.  
Much litigated is the question of when sexual violence against women meets the 
necessary threshold to constitute torture, and is therefore prohibited as a matter of jus 
                                                 
263 Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (n 
258), paragraph 6.  
264 Ibid, paragraph 6. 
265 Ibid, paragraph 9. 
266 Ibid, paragraph 7. 
267 Ibid, paragraph 11.  
268 For a full discussion, see Edwards, A. (2011). Violence Against Women under 
International Human Rights Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 185-6.  
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cogens, irrespective of the presence of armed conflict or the status of the victim. In 
the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation Number 35, the Committee 
offered the following definition:  
The Committee endorses the view of other human rights treaty bodies and 
special procedures mandate-holders that in making the determination of when 
acts of gender-based violence against women amount to torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment, a gender sensitive approach is required to 
understand the level of pain and suffering experienced by women, and that the 
purpose and intent requirement of torture are satisfied when acts or omissions 
are gender specific or perpetrated against a person on the basis of sex.269  
These elements of a human rights-based approach to determining whether sexual 
violence meets the threshold of torture are therefore gender-sensitive in two respects, 
first in determining whether the consequent harm is sufficiently serious and, second, 
in recognising the gender-based purpose or intent.270  
                                                 
269 Ibid, paragraph 17 [emphasis added]. 
270 According to the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (n 262), paragraph 18, examples of gender-based violence that may 
meet this threshold include:  
Violations of women’s sexual and reproductive health and rights, such as 
forced sterilizations, forced abortion, forced pregnancy, criminalisation of 
abortion, denial or delay of safe abortion and post-abortion care, forced 
continuation of pregnancy, abuse and mistreatment of women and girls 
seeking sexual and reproductive health information, goods and services, are 
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United Nations Security Council  
Finally, the UNSC operates to a threshold of ‘threat to international peace and 
security’. In order to activate Chapter VII powers, the UNSC must first determine that 
there is a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.271 The broadest 
and least distinct concept in article 30 is that of threat to the peace.272 (In practice, it is 
almost the only one used by the UNSC, whereas the other two are usually not 
specifically determined.) In the conception of the Charter, the most typical case of a 
threat to the peace is that of an impending armed conflict, however, in practice it is a 
category much more widely invoked. To illustrate, the UNSC has found ongoing 
conflict to constitute threat to the peace, for example ‘continued fighting’ between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea.273 In addition, the UNSC has regarded post-conflict situations as 
threats to the peace, and on this basis, it has for example taken wide-ranging measures 
against Iraq and authorized peacebuilding operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and East 
Timor.274 Further, while the concept may initially have implied inter-state conflict, the 
UNSC quickly abandoned such a reading.275 In addition, the UNSC has regarded 
post-conflict situations as threats to the peace, and on this basis, it has for example 
                                                                                                                                            
forms of gender-based violence that, depending on the circumstances, may 
amount to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 
271 UN Charter (n 69), article 39 
272 Simma et al (n 104), 722.  
273 UNSC Resolution 1298 (2000).  
274 Simma et al (n 104), 723.  
275 Ibid, 723.  
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taken wide-ranging measures against Iraq and authorized peacebuilding operations in 
Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor.276 The Council is uniquely authorised to determine 
whether conflict, violence and instability constitute a ‘threat to international peace 
and security’. This is a definition deliberately designed to afford the Council a very 
significant breadth of discretion, which it has been shown to exercise with enormous 
selectivity.  
The dedicated activity of the UNSC on issues of Women, Peace and Security (WPS) 
since the adoption of Resolution 1325 in 2000 has moved the UNSC to the epicentre 
of policy and advocacy concerning women’s rights in conflict under international law. 
Given the UNSC’s historical lack of engagement on matters of human rights,277 much 
less women’s rights, this turn in the regulation of women’s rights in conflict under 
international law is surprising. The Charter provisions dealing with the powers of the 
UNSC make no formal reference to human rights, nevertheless, the Charter’s 
preambular and article 1 commitments to ‘promote and encourage respect for human 
rights’ imply a role for all UN organs. These Charter provisions have been the subject 
of highly varying interpretation by the UNSC during the seven decades of its 
operation.278  
                                                 
276 Ibid.  
277 See generally Bailey, S.D. (1994). The UN Security Council and Human Rights. 
New York: St Martin’s Press; Genser, J. and Stagno Ugarte, B. (2014). The United 
Nations Security Council in the Age of Human Rights. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
278 Genser and Stagno-Ugarte, ibid.  
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The end of the Cold War brought a new era of human rights across the wider UN 
system,279 and with it increasing scrutiny of the UNSC and its legitimacy, including 
calls for the Council to reform, to democratise and to address the impact on human 
rights of its own operations.280 These calls for reform overlapped with a feminist 
spotlight on rights violations impacting women in conflicts such as the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and calls for a re-focus by the UNSC on the people affected 
by conflict and by its operations.281 This re-focusing is most clearly evidenced in the 
Council’s thematic activity on the protection of civilians282 and on the themes of 
Children and Armed Conflict (CAC),283 and WPS. Its actions, such as advancing 
sanctions for use of child soldiers, not only had a bearing on other thematic agenda 
items, but also provided a model for the kinds of measures that it could advance in 
respect of thematic and human rights issues broadly.284 The final critical step towards 
                                                 
279 See generally Mertus, J. (2009). The United Nations and Human Rights: A Guide 
for a New Era. 2nd ed. Abington and New York: Routledge. 
280 Otto, D. (2006). Securing the ‘Gender Legitimacy’ of the UN Security Council: 
Prising Gender from its Historical Moorings. In H. Charlesworth. and J.M. Coicaud, 
(eds), Fault Lines of International Legitimacy. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Inaugurated by UNSC Resolution 1265 (1999). 
283 Inaugurated by UNSC Resolution 1261 (1999). 
284 Chikuhwa, T. (2009). The Evolution of the United Nations Protection Agenda for 
Children: Applying International Standards. In S. Gates and S. Reich (eds), Child 
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embedding women’s rights in conflict within the UNSC agenda occurred in 2000 with 
the adoption of Resolution 1325 by the UNSC.285  
Noteworthy in the UNSC’s definition of women’s rights is the prominence of 
women’s ‘participation’ throughout the WPS Resolutions. Its prominence is 
evidenced by the frequent use of the term and its invocation throughout the preambles 
and operative provisions of the resolutions.286 The foundation was laid in Resolution 
1325, which called in its first operative paragraph for greater participation by women 
in the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.287 Initiatives such as the 
request in Resolution 1889 for the UNSG to submit to the UNSC a report specifically 
on the theme of women’s participation in peacebuilding288 reiterate and reinforce this 
focus on participation. Further, the resolutions include a focus on substantive issues, 
such as increased programmatic attention to gender-sensitive humanitarian relief, 
which addresses the needs of displaced and refugee women and girls, an awareness of 
                                                                                                                                            
Soldiers in the Age of Fractured State (pp.42). Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press. 
285  UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000). 
286 See further O'Rourke, C. (2014). 'Walk[ing] the Halls of Power'? Understanding 
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women’s caring responsibilities in humanitarian aid and increasing resources for the 
prevention of, and rehabilitation from, sexual violence.289 
Resolution 1325 talks about sexual violence as one of a range of programmatic issues 
to be addressed, including HIV/AIDS, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration, 
conflict reconstruction, refugee camps, DDR of women and girls and the operation of 
the constitution, electoral system, police and judiciary.290 However in the subsequent 
Resolutions, several other policy issues come to be refracted through the lens of 
sexual violence. 291  While Resolution 1325 is justly celebrated for its focus on 
women’s agency, subsequent resolutions have operationalized a narrower definition 
of women’s rights, principally focused on advancing accountability for sexual 
violence in armed conflict, raising concerns about the narrowness of the definition of 
women’s rights in fact underpinning related UNSC activity.292  
The UNSC has not specifically defined sexual violence—it refers to the targeting of 
civilians, including women and children, for ‘rape and other acts of sexual violence’ 
or ‘sexual and gender-based violence’, yet the requirements of a ‘conflict nexus’ have 
been diverse and evolving. First, the UNSC has a prescriptive definition of sexual 
violence that meets the threshold of ‘threat to international peace and security’ and 
thus potentially activates the UNSC’s Chapter VII powers, such as sanctions. This 
                                                 
289 For a breakdown of their substantive focus, see O’Rourke (n 286).  
290  UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000), paragraphs 6, 8, 12.  
291  See, for example, UNSC Resolution 1820 (2008); UNSC Resolution 1888 
(2009), paragraphs 3, 13, 17.   
292 For an overview of this trajectory, see O’Rourke (n 286).   
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definition is limited to ‘sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a tactic of war 
in order to deliberately target civilians or as a part of a widespread or systematic 
attack against civilian populations’.293 The language of Resolution 1820 (2008) was 
repeated in Resolutions 1888 (2009), 294  1960 (2010), 295  and 2106 (2013). 296  The 
framework of Resolution 1820 thus limits what type of sexual violence can trigger the 
application of Chapter VII enforcement measures to widespread and systematic 
practices, or to tactics of war. The definition is prescriptive in terms of both the scale 
of sexual violence and the direct conflict nexus required.  
More open and evolving is the definition of sexual violence and conflict nexus that 
underpins the UNSC’s thematic reporting and documentation of sexual violence in 
conflict. Whilst Resolutions 1820 and 1888 initially mandated the Secretary-General 
to report to the UNSC only on sexual violence in situations on its agenda, 297 
Resolution 1960 requested: 
the Secretary-General to include in his annual reports submitted pursuant to 
resolutions 1820 (2008) and 1888 (2009) detailed information on parties to 
armed conflict that are credibly suspected of committing or being responsible 
for acts of rape or other forms of sexual violence, 
                                                 
293 UNSC Resolution 1820 (2008), paragraph 1. 
294 UNSC Resolution 1888 (2009), paragraph 19.  
295 UNSC Resolution 1960 (2010), paragraph 7. 
296 UNSC Resolution 2106 (2013), paragraph 13. 
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thereby broadening the definition to also include sexual violence perpetrated in 
situations of armed conflict not on the agenda of the UNSC.  
Resolution 1960 was significant in the UNSC’s definition of sexual violence and 
conflict nexus also for introducing to the WPS resolutions the term ‘conflict-related 
sexual violence’. Whilst the WPS resolutions had hitherto used prescriptive language 
on sexual violence and conflict nexus, Resolution 1960 established the Monitoring, 
Analysis and Reporting Arrangements (MARA) for ‘conflict-related sexual violence’, 
which included, but was not limited to, rape in situations of armed conflict.298 Further, 
the reference to ‘conflict-related sexual violence’ expressly included post-conflict 
settings.  
There are tensions between the protection and participation emphasis within 
definitions of women’s rights advanced through the UNSC through the WPS 
resolutions. While a focus on women’s political agency and participation was the 
initial impetus for the WPS agenda, later resolutions and – critically – initiatives 
towards enforcement have largely emphasized a protective focus on the protection of 
                                                 
298 UNSC Resolution 1960 (2010), paragraph 8:  
Requests the Secretary General to establish monitoring, analysis and reporting 
arrangements on conflict-related sexual violence, including rape in situations 
of armed conflict and post-conflict and other situations relevant to the 
implementation of resolution 1888 (2009), as appropriate, and taking into 
account the specificity of each country, that ensure a coherent and coordinated 
approach at the field-level. 
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women from ‘widespread and systematic sexual violence’. 299  Moreover, in its 
implementation of the WPS resolutions, the UNSC has largely resisted a broad 
definition of women’s rights in conflict, with some permanent members arguing that 
the WPS agenda applies only to the country situations on the agenda of the Council 
and not to all UN member states or conflict-affected settings.300 Further, feminist 
observers have identified evidence of increasing securitisation of women’s rights 
emerging from the UNSC’s WPS agenda, most blatantly in efforts to integrate (or co-
                                                 
299 With three of resolutions connecting the Security Council’s activities to combat 
sexual violence with the use of force. That is, in paragraph one of the first three sexual 
violence resolutions the Security Council identifies systematic and widespread sexual 
violence as exacerbating conflict and as potentially impeding the maintenance of 
international peace and security. UNSC Resolution 1820, paragraph 1; UNSC 
Resolution 1888, paragraph 1; UNSC Resolution 1960, paragraph 1. The Security 
Council’s choice of language in this thrice-repeated paragraph implicitly invokes 
Chapter VII action, as a potential means to halt widespread and systematic sexual 
violence in conflict regions. See further Heathcote, G. (2016). Robust Peacekeeping, 
Gender, and the Protection of Civilians. In J. Farrall & H. Charlesworth (Eds.), 
Strengthening the Rule of Law through the UN Security Council. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
300 See further text at nn 409-411. 
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opt) the WPS and the Council’s counter-terror activities. 301  The concern is that 
women’s rights issues—such as violence against women—have become defined and 
addressed according to the UNSC’s mandate to maintain international peace and 
security, rather than in line with the experiences of women and girls and the 
fulfilment of their rights.302 These dynamics and concerns raise important questions to 
be investigated through the case studies.  
 
Monitoring Bodies and Enforcement Procedures 
An important feminist entry point into analysis of international law is the weaker 
monitoring bodies and enforcement procedures attached to women’s rights.303 This 
critique initially focused on IHRL and its implicit hierarchies between so-called ‘first’ 
and ‘second’ generation rights, which is understood to disproportionately impact 
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women due to gender dynamics of poverty. 304  Likewise, the historically weak 
enforcement mechanisms attached to CEDAW underpins feminist critique of human 
rights.305 Selective enforcement of ICL, often to the exclusion of more ‘complex’ 
crimes such as sexual violence, is an established point of feminist discontent with the 
regime.306 More recent iterations of the enforcement gap concerning women’s rights 
under international law emphasize the relative lack of enforcement procedures 
attached to the UNSC’s WPS resolutions.307 Thus, monitoring and enforcement are 
established and enduring areas of feminist concern in international law.   
What is most clear, however, is the relatively weak monitoring bodies and 
enforcement procedures attached to most measures designed to limit the impact of 
conflict on civilians. This broader deficiency of international law is, by some 
measure, most pronounced in respect of IHL. Indeed, it is likely that the absence of 
meaningful monitoring and enforcement procedures internal to the regime has been an 
important factor in discouraging feminist engagement. ICL is appropriately thought of 
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Human Rights. Human Rights Quarterly, 12, 486-498.  
305 Cook, R. (1990). Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination of Women. Virginia Journal of International Law, 30, 643-716.  
306 de Londras, F. (2009). Prosecuting Sexual Violence in the Ad Hoc International 
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. UCD Working Papers in 
Law, Criminology & Socio-Legal Studies. Research Paper No. 06/2009. Dublin; 
Chappell (n 67).   
307 O'Rourke & Swaine (n 235). 
 145 
as the enforcement element of IHL, though it is inevitably selective in the 
constituency of victims, crimes and perpetrators ultimately reached. Further, its focus 
is on individual perpetrators. While IHRL has a highly developed system of 
monitoring state party treaty compliance, its enforcement capacities have certain 
inherent weaknesses, in particular when applied to either women’s rights or conflict 
settings. Finally, the UNSC brings unique and remarkable enforcement potential to 
women’s rights in conflict, yet these powers are exercised in line with the vagaries of 
geo-political dynamics, determined in particular by the five permanent members of 
the Council. Further, the evidence is that, while the WPS resolutions are speaking 
increasingly directly to the Council’s various powers under Chapters VI and VII, it is 
nevertheless questionable as to whether the Council’s exercise of its powers speak 
back to the WPS resolutions and the agenda more broadly. Moreover, arguably 
uniquely of the four regimes, it is the UNSC’s enforcement powers – even when 
exercised ostensibly in pursuit of women’s rights in conflict – that may carry 
significant potential of detrimental impact on the rights of women. These dynamics 
are explored more fully in this section.  
 
International Humanitarian Law  
The most commonly identified weakness of IHL concerns its institutional structures 
and enforcement procedures. Grounded in a principle of reciprocity between armed 
actors, the regime operates without an effective monitoring body or enforcement 
procedure. Despite the gendered limitations of IHL, there is no doubt that IHL’s 
under-enforcement poses a grave challenge to women’s rights in conflict. According 
to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, three enforcement procedures 
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attend IHL, namely ‘protecting powers’, international fact-finding commissions and 
prosecutions. Yet these organs are not functioning. ‘Protecting powers' are third party 
states that must be accepted by both parties to the conflict. In practice, third states are 
always reluctant to become formally involved. Further, the First Additional Protocol 
establishes an ‘International Fact-Finding Commission' which may be charged by the 
belligerents with the task of fact-finding.308 However, this provision has been called 
the 'sleeping beauty of the forest' and has to date never been activated. In the conflicts 
of the last 20 years, no international supervisory organ has been able to verify on the 
ground the numerous violations committed by belligerents.309 Due to the limitations 
inherent to these procedures, Antonio Cassese concludes frankly: ‘There is no 
effective mechanism for determining when a belligerent has violated IHL’.310 
The chapter has noted IHL’s gendered limitations, with little prospect of progress new 
law-making, as well as the public position of the ICRC that changing ‘gendered 
power relations’ is not within its mandate. Combined with these critical enforcement 
deficiencies, one might be forgiven for marginalising IHL as a regime for the 
meaningful protection and advancement of women’s rights in conflict. Nevertheless, 
as this section reviews, the ICRC in practice plays a unique role in promoting 
compliance with IHL on the ground in conflict-affected settings, often with a large 
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and relatively well-resourced country presence. Thus it is a critical actor for 
understanding the relationship between international law and women’s rights in 
conflict.  
The ICRC’s activities fall into three broad categories, all of which implicate the 
protection of women’s rights in conflict. First, the ICRC is expressly authorized under 
IHL to provide humanitarian assistance to wounded and sick combatants and civilian 
populations, subject to the consent of the parties to the conflict.311 Thus, while IHL 
imposes an obligations on parties to conflict concerning civilian access to 
humanitarian aid,312 in circumstances in which belligerent actors are failing to meet 
these obligations, the ICRC negotiates with the parties on matters relating to the 
supply of food for the civilian population: safe access to fields and crops, safe passage 
of food convoys, security of food assistance operations.313 In addition to delivering 
                                                 
311 First Geneva Convention (n 43), article 9, The same text is replicated across 
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humanitarian assistance, therefore, such activities also support and encourage parties 
to comply with IHL. Likewise, the ICRC has interpreted its assistance mandate to 
include administering the central tracing and messaging service in order to reunite 
families, further promoting compliance with pertinent provisions of IHL.314  
Second, the ICRC engages in protection activities, which is analogous to a monitoring 
role, but also involves direct representations to weapons bearers to encourage the 
cessation of named IHL violations. The Third Geneva Convention requires that states 
give it access to prisoners of war;315 it conducts hundreds of confidential visits and 
authors numerous reports to monitor compliance by armies, security forces, and non-
state armed groups with IHL. Its protection activities are largely conducted through its 
country field offices, which visit prisons and places of detention and monitor the 
behaviour of belligerent actors, in order to determine compliance with IHL, draft 
relevant reports and discuss recommendations with responsible authorities at different 
levels.316 This monitoring role involves direct communication between the ICRC and 
those involved in armed conflicts (or other situations in which the ICRC plays a role, 
such as security detentions) about their past or current conduct. The ICRC engages in 
a highly confidential dialogue with targets in an attempt to end violations of IHL.  
The ICRC’s ‘Doctrine 15’ sets out the four steps in its communications with 
belligerent actors, namely Phase 1, a reminder of obligations issued to conflict parties 
upon the onset of conflict, set out in a confidential aide-memoire; Phase 2, bilateral 
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confidential memoranda and discussions detailing compliance problems observed by 
the ICRC with IHL; Phase 3, mobilization of other actors: if confidential dialogue is 
not improving the treatment of IHL violations, the ICRC will engage with other 
actors, such as third party governments, international organisations and NGOs in 
order to cultivate other influences on conflict parties; Phase 4, public criticism either 
the quality of dialogue with a particular belligerent actor, or specifically naming IHL 
violations, is the last resort of the ICRC and only activated in a minority of 
situations.317  
The reasons for the ICRC not more publicly calling out violations of IHL are closely 
connected to its humanitarian activities. Its ‘pragmatic’ approach to its activities 
favours remaining in-country and on-the-ground over the ‘naming and shaming’ 
tactics of, for example, human rights non-governmental organisations. As David 
Forsythe, leading scholar of the ICRC, observes:  
[T]he organisation (the ICRC) was conscious of its need for cooperation from 
public authorities and therefore was careful not to proceed beyond the realm 
of their consent… [A]dvocacy groups like Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch, that also do not run service programmes inside states, believe in 
a more adversarial relationship with states that features attempted public 
pressure – the naming and shaming game. They believe in the necessity of 
                                                 
317 Doctrine 15, reproduced in (2005) Action by the International Committee of the 
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uncomfortable conflict, while the ICRC’s neutral protection is based on hope 
for quiet co-operation.318 
Hence, the ICRC pursues compliance with IHL ‘in a very particular manner’.319 It 
does not take the form of public condemnation, but behind-the-scenes 
communication. Ratner characterises the approach of the ICRC principally as one of 
‘persuasion’. 320  Indeed, as he notes, the ICRC’s ‘compliance strategy’ frequently 
avoids overt reference to IHL violations, or indeed to IHL. This modus operandi is 
closely determined by the challenges identified in the definition of conflict and 
sources of law discussion, namely states typically resist conceding the application of 
IHL to an internal conflict, due to reputational and other costs.  
It should be noted that the ICRC does not confine its humanitarian assistance 
activities to settings in which an armed conflict prevails. The ICRC draws on its own 
statutes – as distinct from IHL – to ground its mandate to operate in other situations of 
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violence.321  It is also, however, subject to state consent. In the event of internal 
disturbances and tensions, and in any other situation that warrants humanitarian 
action, the ICRC also enjoys a right of initiative. Thus, wherever IHL does not apply, 
the ICRC may offer its services to governments without that offer constituting 
interference in the internal affairs of the state concerned.322 The language of ‘internal 
disturbance’ is therefore pragmatically invoked by the ICRC in settings in which it 
wishes to discharge its protection and assistance mandate and work to commit 
belligerent actors to actual compliance with IHL principles, if not formal commitment 
to its legal strictures.  
Third, the ICRC engages in IHL promotion activities.  It issues public interpretations 
of the law; and it actively supports new rules in many areas. The ICRC thus regards 
itself as the ‘promoter and guardian of IHL’.323 The ICRC promotes IHL by educating 
state and armed non-state armed groups about implementing IHL through legislation, 
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military manuals, and training.324 In its education and training of participants in armed 
conflicts, the focus is on translating the norms of IHL (regardless of the state’s 
ratification status or domestic law) into doctrine, operational policies, and rules of 
engagement. Having recognized the need for contact with non-state armed groups, for 
at least a decade it has attempted to teach them about IHL as well. Such an initiative 
presents special challenges because the groups typically operate clandestinely, often 
have unusual hierarchical structures, and may prove unfamiliar with or suspicious 
about IHL (for example, seeing it as a tool of states against rebel groups).325 
The value of the ICRC’s confidential and pragmatic approach has been recognised. 
For example, the ICTY has determined that the ICRC has a right under customary 
international law to non-disclosure of confidential information in the possession of 
ICRC employees.326 Likewise, Rule 73 of the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
reflect this same commitment to protecting the unique confidential activity of the 
ICRC in conflict-affected settings. To quote Schucksmith:  
The ICRC… must remain very remote from any kind of judicial activities, as 
it must not be perceived as documenting violations in order to feed 
prosecutions… If suspicions were raised of such a situation, then the dialogue 
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the Red Cross. The Oxford Handbook of Law in Armed Conflict A. Clapham and P. 
Gaeta. Oxford & NY, Oxford University Press: 20-36.  
325 Ratner (n 320), 468. 
326 Prosecutor v Simic et al, IT-95-9-PT, Decision on the prosecution Motion under 
Rule 73 for a Ruling Concerning the Testimony of a Witness, 27 July 1999.  
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that the ICRC has established on the ground would be ruined. This would have 
repercussions, not only from the perspective dissemination of IHL to those 
involved in conflict, but also for the people relying on the protection and 
assistance of the ICRC.327  
This important distinction between the ICRC’s confidential activities with belligerent 
actors and the pursuit of prosecutions can also be justified on pragmatic grounds. It 
does nevertheless present something of a quandary when seeking to understand the 
organisation charged to be the ‘guardian’ of IHL: it works directly with armed actors 
to prevent and mitigate IHL violations, but cannot work post facto to secure 
accountability for the most serious violations of IHL. Likewise, it is ‘guardian’ of IHL 
but strategically avoids naming IHL violations, often even in private, and remains 
strategically silent as to whether IHL applies to particular country and conflict-
settings. Together, these dynamics has led some observers to conclude that Geneva 
law is as far from country office activities as their physical distance from Geneva.328  
Finally, the proliferation of international criminal courts and tribunals has contributed 
significantly to enforcement opportunities for the laws of armed conflict. IHL is no 
longer seen as a law with no means of enforcement or accountability, but rather as a 
dynamic source of obligations for both States and individuals in their conduct in 
armed conflicts, both international and non-international. Thus, in practical terms, 
there is little observable enforcement of IHL in specific conflicts other than 
                                                 
327 Shucksmith (n 322), 162. 
328   For example, Forsythe, D.P. (2005). The Humanitarians: The International 
Committee of the Red Cross. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press. 
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prosecution under ICL. However, while international criminal justice offers 
enforcement bodies and procedures, it is hardly clear yet that is effective as a 
preventative dimension, 329  further emphasizing the importance of the ICRC’s 
protection and promotion activities. 
 
International Criminal Law  
It is, at least in part, the weakness of the monitoring and enforcement procedures 
attached to IHL that has underpinned extensive feminist focus, engagement and legal 
advocacy under ICL. ICL has offered a means to respond to widespread impunity for 
the most serious violations of IHL. Moreover, through the existence of formalised 
criminal tribunals, ICL has offered clear institutions to target advocacy and 
intervention. Feminist actors have frequently been to the forefront of calls for 
prosecutions for international crimes.330  
Enforcement activity under ICL is epitomised by the International Criminal Court, 
established by the 1998 Rome Statute. In addition, it can be argued that the Office of 
the Prosecutor plays a monitoring role through its mandate to consider all credible 
evidence of wrongdoing in order to determine whether authorisation should be sought 
                                                 
329 Kellenberger (n 324), 25.  
330 See, for example, Copelon, R. (1994). Surfacing Gender: Re-engraving Crimes 
Against Women in Humanitarian Law. Hastings Women's Law Journal, 5(2), 243- 
266. 
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from the Court to proceed to an investigation. 331  To this end, the Prosecutor is 
authorised to seek further information from states, UN organs, national and 
international non-governmental organisations and any other credible source. 332  In 
practice, the Office of the Prosecutor operates quite publicly about the countries either 
being considered for investigation and under investigation, thereby prompting further 
scrutiny of those conflict-settings.333 The Informal Expert Paper on Complementarity 
advocates two underpinning principles, namely partnership (with national 
jurisdictions) and vigilance.334 The principle of ‘vigilance’ speaks to the Office of the 
Prosecutor’s monitoring role: ‘The Prosecutor must be able to gather information in 
order to verify that national procedures are carried out genuinely. Cooperative States 
should generally benefit from a presumption of bona fides and baseline levels of 
scrutiny, but where there are indicia that a national process is not genuine, the 
                                                 
331 Rome Statute (n 43), article 15(2).  
332  Ibid, article 15(2). See further International Criminal Court Office of the 
Prosecutor. (2013). Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation. The Hague, 
ICC-OTP. 
333 See, for example, the Colombian case: Urueña, R. (2017). Prosecutorial Politics: 
The ICC's Influence in Colombian Peace Processes, 2003-2017. American Journal of 
International Law, 111(1), 104-125.   
334 International Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor. (2003). Informal Expert 
Paper: The Principle of Complementarity in Practice. The Hague, ICC-OTP, 
paragraph 1.  
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Prosecutor must be poised to take follow-up steps, leading if necessary to an exercise 
of jurisdiction.’335 
Further complicating the study of monitoring and enforcement under ICL is its diffuse 
practice across domestic, hybrid and international courts. Thus, ICL is not only made 
and enforced at The Hague, rather it occurs in domestic jurisdictions in several 
settings. Indeed, the first prosecutor to the ICC asserted that the Court’s success will 
be measured by a reduction, not an increase, in the number of prosecutions 
proceeding through the ICC. 336  This claim is due to the nature of the court’s 
contingent jurisdiction and the principle of ‘complementarity’, which provides that 
the court may only pursue prosecutions in the event that the state in which the crimes 
are occurring is ‘unwilling or unable’ to pursue prosecutions. 337  Thus the Court 
espouses ‘complementarity’ in two senses: first, as an instrument to overcome 
sovereignty fears against the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court and as a tool to 
remedy shortcomings or failures of domestic jurisdiction through application of the 
criteria listed in article 17; and second, through the more diffuse concept of ‘positive 
complementarity’, in which the Court might encourage genuine national proceedings 
rather than placing the onus on ICC proceedings, thereby encouraging nation states to 
                                                 
335 Ibid.  
336 Quoted ibid, paragraph 1.  
337 Rome Statute (n 43), article 17.  
 157 
emulate the investigative and prosecutorial approaches of the Court in the pursuit of 
improved domestic criminal accountability for international crimes.338  
The principle of complementarity lies at the heart of the functioning of the ICC. 
Pursuant to this principle, the ICC monitors the primary jurisdiction of national 
courts.339  ‘The complementarity regime serves as a mechanism to encourage and 
facilitate the compliance of States with their primary responsibility to investigate and 
prosecute core crimes.’340 The first experiences of the ICC in respect of the principle 
of complementarity immediately gave rise to serious questions. The first three 
investigations of the ICC Prosecutor – the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the 
Central African Republic, and Uganda – were triggered by referrals made by those 
states pursuant to article 14 of the ICC Statute.341 Negotiated self-referrals while not 
                                                 
338  Stahn, C. (2007). Complementarity: A Tale of Two Notions. Criminal Law 
Forum, 19, 87-113; see also El Zeidy, M. (2001-2002). The Principle of 
Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law. 
Michigan Journal of International Law, 23, 869-975. 
339 The standards of review and the practical application of the principle are the 
object of Article 17 of the Rome Statute. See further International Criminal Court 
Office of the Prosecutor (n 334). 
340 Ibid, paragraph 2.  
341 Decision assigning the situation in Uganda to Pre-Trial Chamber II, Case No. 
ICC-02/04, ICC, Presidency, 5 July 2004; Decision Assigning the Situation of the 
DRC to Pre-Trial Chamber I, Case No. ICC-01/04, ICC, presidency, 5 July 2004; 
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against the letter of the Statute, may be against the spirit of the principle of 
complementarity, the basis of which is the primary duty of states to investigate and 
prosecute international crimes. The risk of ‘selective or asymmetrical self-referrals’ is 
an obvious one. The self-referrals were directed at crimes committed by rebels in a 
civil war situation, suggesting that states are using the Court to expose rebels 
internationally and to dispose of them through the judicial processes of the ICC.342 
The selectivity of these actions raises broader legitimacy questions about the 
operation of the Court.343 
The specific implications of the complementarity regime for the protection and 
promotion of women’s rights in conflict has been the subject of important critical 
feminist analysis. 344  The Statute institutes a complementarity regime, as well as 
specifically criminalizing a range of sexual and gender-based violations. However, 
according to Chappell and colleagues, the Statute fails to link these two innovative 
provisions, leaving a ‘gender justice complementarity shadow’. They argue that the 
Office of the Prosecutor’s apparent inattention to gender biases underpinning 
                                                                                                                                            
Decision Assigning the situation in the Central African Republic to Pre-Trial 
Chamber III, Case No. ICC-01/05, ICC, Presidency, 19 January 2005.  
342 See especially Cassese, A. (2006). ‘Is the ICC still having teething problems?’ 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, 4, 436.  
343 Schabas, W. ‘Does International Criminal Justice have a Future?’, Transitional 
Justice Institute Annual Summer School Public Lecture, Ulster University, 15 June 
2016. 
344 Chappell, Grey & Waller (n 67). See generally Chappell (n 67). 
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domestic legal systems has left impunity for perpetrators of sexual violence intact and 
the victims of these crimes unrecognized. To tackle impunity for sexual violence 
through complementarity therefore requires the ICC prosecutor to include an 
examination of gender biases in domestic legal systems when testing state action, 
willingness and ability in order to understand how these biases impede access to 
justice for victims of sexual violence.345 Some creative advocates have sought to 
move the Prosecutor further in this direction.346 
ICL offers the clear appeal to anti-impunity advocates of individual criminal 
accountability for specific perpetrators of international crimes. It is accountability and 
justice in the classic sense of the term. Thus, there is robustness to enforcement 
activities under ICL that may have little parallel in other regimes of relevance. It bears 
reflection, nevertheless, that ICL enforcement activities pursued at the international 
level are by necessity highly selective in terms of perpetrators – and thus victims and 
violations – formally reached.  
 
International Human Rights Law  
IHRL derives primarily from international and regional human rights treaties. The 
international system for the protection of human rights contains both treaty-based 
elements, established by human rights treaties, and so-called ‘Charter-based’ 
elements, grounded in the human rights provisions of the UN Charter. Whereas the 
human rights treaties establish legal obligations on states that are monitored by bodies 
                                                 
345 Ibid.  
346 See further discussion infra Chapter 6.  
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of independent experts, the Charter-based system is driven primarily by states and 
thus constitutes a peer-led system of political accountability. With the book’s focus on 
international law, the activities of the human rights treaty bodies are prioritised for 
discussion here and in the case studies. Nevertheless, the Charter-based bodies can 
prove important in the pursuit of political accountability where legal avenues have 
proven unfruitful. Thus, the section concludes with a brief discussion of the key 
Charter-based protections for human rights.  
There are four broad monitoring and enforcement activities under international human 
rights treaties. Although their specifics vary, these activities are, first, periodic 
examination of state party compliance; second, ‘monitoring plus’ activities calling 
attention to an acute rights issue outside of the normal periodic report cycle; third, 
hearing individual petitions alleging rights violations; and fourth, conducting inquiries 
into alleged ‘grave or systematic’ violations of the treaty.347 For reasons of economy 
and practicality, discussion in this section focuses on the operation of the CEDAW 
Committee, as illustrative of the broader modus operandi of human rights treaty 
monitoring and enforcement.  
                                                 
347 The authority to conduct inquiries into ‘grave or systematic’ alleged violations 
was unique to the Committee Against Torture until the adoption of the Optional 
Protocol to CEDAW in 2000. Consequently, the Human Rights Committee and 
CERD, for example, do not have the authority to conduct inquiries. Since 2000, the 
inquiry procedure is routinely included in newer human rights treaties, though with 
state discretion to opt-out of such provisions if they wish, see for example Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 13 December 
2006, 2518 UNTS 283, article 8.  
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The entry into force of the CEDAW Convention in 1981 established a treaty-based 
system of state accountability for an enumerated list of women’s human rights, 
involving the periodic review of state compliance348 by an independent committee of 
experts. 349  Both in law and in practice, the Committee’s mechanisms for state 
accountability continue to operate during conflict and civil unrest. Most importantly, 
the Committee has led the periodic review of state compliance with obligations under 
the Convention. For example, in its monitoring activities of periodic state reporting, 
the Committee has drawn attention to levels of women’s representation in post-
conflict democratic institutions350 and has likewise urged state parties to ensure the 
inclusion of women in ongoing peace processes within state parties jurisdiction.351 
Moreover, the Committee has drawn attention to the impact of conflict on substantive 
rights guaranteed under the Convention, such as the right of women and girls to 
                                                 
348 CEDAW (n 74), article 18.  
349 Ibid, article 17.  
350 Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
(2007). Concluding Observations to Serbia. UN Doc. CEDAW/C/SCG/CO/1; 
Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
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351 Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
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22; Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
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education on a basis of non-discrimination.352 Further, the Committee has enhanced 
these periodic reporting procedures through the activation of what might be termed 
‘monitoring-plus’ activities. These have taken the form of ‘statements’ addressing 
particular women’s human rights situation of concern.353  
The structural weaknesses historically associated with the Convention, due to the lack 
of any associated enforcement procedures, have been ameliorated in important ways 
through the entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the Convention in December 
2000. Enforcement activities for conflict-related violations have, to date, been limited. 
The Committee has, however, been consistent in rejecting any claim by states that 
                                                 
352  Conflict featuring in Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women. (2007). Concluding Observations to Sierra Leone. 
UN Doc. CEDAW/C/SLE/CO/5, paragraph 30; Committee for the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women. (2007). Concluding Observations to 
Colombia. UN Doc. CEDAW/C/COL/CO/6, paragraph 30; Committee for the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. (2009). Concluding 
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353 For example, Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women. (2009). Statement on the situation in Gaza. UN Doc. A/64/38 (supp) 
Annex II; Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women. (2010). Statement on the Inclusion of Afghan Women in the Process of Peace 
Building, Security and Reconstruction in Afghanistan. UN Doc. /E/CN6/2010/CRP 2 
Annex V 199.  
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issues of asylum are not addressed by the Convention.354 Further, while all of the 
asylum petitions to the Committee were held inadmissible on the basis that the 
applicant had either failed to exhaust domestic remedies or failed to sufficiently 
substantiate the alleged violation, further jurisprudence may illuminate whether more 
flexible standards are applied to both requirements in the case of individual petitions 
emerging from conflict-affected settings, where domestic legal systems are likely to 
be debilitated and the ability to gather evidence hampered. Likewise, the Committee 
has not yet activated the Optional Protocol’s inquiry procedure in order to investigate 
conflict-related ‘grave or systematic violations’ of CEDAW. Nevertheless, the 
consistent line of the Committee’s inquiry activity has been to investigate and hold 
state parties to account for violence against women by non-state actors,355 which has 
likely relevance for its approach to ‘grave or systematic violations’ occurring in 
conflict-affected settings.  
Further questions concerning the efficacy of human rights monitoring and 
enforcement procedures concern the apparent impotency of treaty monitoring bodies 
in the face of the defiant state. One such example is the responsibility for the human 
and political rights of Palestinian women in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
(OPT). In the periodic reports submitted by the State of Israel to CEDAW since its 
ratification in 1991, Israel’s stated position is that ‘the Convention does not apply 
                                                 
354   Y.W. v. Denmark, Communication No. 51/2013, UN Doc. 
CEDAW/C/60/D/51/2013 (2015); S.O. v. Canada, Communication No. 49/2013, UN 
Doc. CEDAW/C/59/D/49/2013 (2014). 
355 Ibid. 
 164 
beyond its own territory,’ and on this basis it refuses to report on the OPT or respond 
to questions about women in those areas.356 In 2005, the CEDAW committee rejected 
this position and urged Israel to reconsider its obligations ‘in regard to all persons 
under its jurisdiction, including women in the Occupied Territories’. 357  Despite 
CEDAW Committee and civil society activity, Israel continues to deny its obligations 
under the Convention in the OPT. This is one amongst many possible illustrations of 
the limits of the Committee’s powers, and indeed of human rights treaty-monitoring 
bodies more broadly.  
The Charter-based human rights system comprises the human rights principles and 
institutional mechanisms that different UN organs have developed in the exercise of 
their UN Charter powers. Since 1946, the primary Charter-based vehicle for the 
protection and promotion of human rights was the Commission on Human Rights, 
which consisted of 54 UN member states elected on a rotating basis (and subsequently 
                                                 
356 Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. 
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reconceived and re-named as the Human Rights Council in 2006).358 Charter-based 
mechanisms and procedures thus emerge from intergovernmental negotiation and 
multi-lateral agreement. The adoption of so-called ‘special procedures’, which are 
independent human rights experts with mandates to report and advise on human rights 
from a thematic or country-specific perspective, are central to Charter-based 
monitoring and enforcement activities.359 These special procedures can be individual 
Special Rapporteurs, Working Groups of independent experts, 360  commissions of 
inquiry, or fact-finding missions. 361 Special procedures are more clearly determined 
and circumscribed by ongoing political bargaining amongst states: their mandates are 
established, renewed and amended on a continuing basis that guarantees consistent 
                                                 
358  Alston, P. (2006). Reconceiving the UN Human Rights Regime: Challenges 
Confronting the New UN Human Rights Council. Melbourne Journal of International 
Law 7(1), 185–224, 185-187; 
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361 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR). 
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political influence by states – that is not the case of treaty-based mechanisms, which 
typically assert a good degree of autonomy once established.  
Charter-based human rights mechanisms offer the advantage (from a promotion and 
protection perspective) that they do not require specific treaty ratification in order to 
initiate scrutiny of the behaviour of a specific state. Further, they do not require the 
negotiation of new treaties in order to address new or emerging human rights 
challenges, thus can act with greater dynamism.  On the same grounds, however, their 
activities occupy an unclear legal status and such institutions operate at considerable 
distance from state consent, a factor generally believed to reduce both legitimacy and 
the likelihood of state compliance.362  
Efforts to improve coherence across the human rights treaties, in addition to broader 
political dynamics, led to the introduction of some significant additional monitoring 
and enforcement mechanisms in the international human rights system in 2006.363 The 
re-constitution of the Commission on Human Rights as the Human Rights Council 
introduced a new peer monitoring and enforcement mechanism for the panoply of 
human rights treaties, namely Universal Periodic Review. 364  Further, the Human 
Rights Council retains the capacity to establish commissions of inquiry and fact-
                                                 
362  Gutter, J. (2007). Special Procedures and the Human Rights Council: 
Achievements and Challenges Ahead. Human Rights Law Review, 7, 93. 98-99.  
363 UN General Assembly. (2006). Resolution 60/251. 
364  Mandated by ibid. See further ‘Basic Facts about the UPR’  
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/BasicFacts.aspx.  
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finding missions on IHRL. 365  Finally, of the special procedures, the Special 
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women366 has arguably been the most important, as 
an influential advocate for women’s rights in armed conflict. The office-holder has 
brought both greater scrutiny to women’s rights in conflict,367 as well as a further 
procedure for individual complaints.368  
 
United Nations Security Council   
                                                 
365 See generally United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights 
(n 361).  
366  Human Rights Council. (2006). Resolution 23/25. Accelerating efforts to 
eliminate all forms of violence against women: preventing and responding to rape and 
other forms of sexual violence. UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/23/25. 
367 See especially United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, 
its Causes and Consequences (2003). Integration of the Human Rights of Women and 
the Gender Perspective: Violence Against Women. UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/75. 
368 Note that the authority to consider individual complaints is not included in the 
formal mandate for the role, Commission on Human Rights, Question of integrating 
the rights of women into the human rights mechanisms of the United Nations and the 
elimination of violence against women Resolution 1994/45. Rather it has emerged as 
part of the office practice, see further 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Women/SRWomen/Pages/Complaints.aspx. 
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The UNSC’s expanding role in normative and legal developments on women’s rights 
in conflict brings robust enforcement potential to responses to violations. Under the 
Charter, it is the UNSC that bears ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security’.369 While the UNSC’s powers are not absolute, they 
are very far-reaching. If the Council determines the existence of a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression,370 it can make recommendations,371 order 
provisional measures, 372  or take non-military or military enforcement measures 
according to the exigencies of the particular situation. Envisaged as the enforcement 
body of the United Nations, the UNSC has unique authority to make decisions that 
bind all UN member states 373  and extraordinary powers that include sanctions, 
peacekeeping and authorisation of the use of force.374 Further, it has a general power 
to establish ‘such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance its 
functions’.375 It is for these reasons that commentators have referred to the UNSC’s 
                                                 
369 UN Charter (n 69), article 24 (1).  
370 Ibid, article 39.  
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372 Ibid.  
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role as an ‘executive of the international community’376 or even of an ‘international 
government’.377 
Under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the Council has the capacity to recommend a 
wide range of pacific measures for the settlement of disputes. The thrust of Chapter 
VI is that Council should investigate situations that have conflict potential at an early 
stage, well before they erupt into inter-state conflict.378 The Council under Chapter VI 
is given broad latitude to determine that conditions within a state might hold the seeds 
to international conflict. Article 33 sets out a range of measures whereby the UNSC 
may support parties to a dispute to reach pacific settlement, namely: negotiation, fact-
finding, mediation (to include ‘good offices’), conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement and ‘other peaceful means’.379 In practice, the Council most frequently 
                                                 
376 Dupuy, PM, ‘The Constitutional Dimension of the Charter of the UN Revisited’, 
Max Planck UNYB 1 (1997), pp. 21-4.  
377 Morganthau, Politics Among Nations (1948), 380.  
378 Luck, E. C. (2006). UN Security Council: Practice and Promise. London and 
New York: Routledge, 21.  
379  These options, and the Council’s interpretation and related activities, are 
discussed Simma et al (n 104), 588-90. UN Charter (n 69), article 34: UNSC can 
investigate whether the continuance of any dispute is likely to give rise to 
endangerment of international peace and security; UNSC can recommend appropriate 
procedures or measures of adjustment (article 36(1)), but Council should recommend 
legal disputes to the ICJ (art 36(3)); article 38, where the parties to the dispute so 
request, UNSC can recommend terms of settlement. 
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suggests that contending parties enter into negotiations.380 The Council encourages, in 
almost all cases, stakeholders to engage in inclusive political dialogue as a means of 
creating an environment conducive to the holding of elections, 381  negotiations,382 
peace and reconciliations processes,383 discussions384 or the strengthening of national 
unity and dialogue over key aspects such as internal boundaries.385  
During the period of the Cold War, when there was insufficient consensus at the 
Council to robustly exercise its Chapter VII enforcement powers, the indeterminacy 
of Chapter VI was exploited to advance a broad set of non-coercive peacemaking 
activities, most significantly the deployment of country-specific peacemaking 
                                                 
380 Examples abound: Iraq and Iran were asked to accept mediation, conciliation, or 
other forms of peaceful settlement. UNSC Resolution 479 (1980) and UNSC 
Resolution 582 (1986). The Council suggested having a dispute settled by arbitration, 
for the Suez Canal dispute, UNSC Resolution 118 (1956). 
381  UNSC Resolution 2065 (2012), Preamble; UNSC Resolution 2088 (2013), 
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paragraph 2. 
384 UNSC Resolution 2058 (2012), paragraph 1. 
385  UNSC Resolution 2061 (2012), Preamble.   
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missions to consenting states. 386  Peacekeeping by consensus under Chapter VI 
mushroomed in the 1990s, with their functions being considerably expanded 
(Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Yugoslavia). 387 As consent of the parties is 
essential, the right of these missions to use force is a problematic issue.388 In the 
Congo, a concept which could be called active self-defence was developed. The force 
would assert its right of freedom of movement and any attempt to hinder the exercise 
of this right cold be countered with force in the name of self-defense. 389  Their 
characterisation has nevertheless caused some legal issues: while they are supposed to 
be mandated under Chapter VI, their military character can give the feel of Chapter 
VII. Hence, the language of ‘Chapter VI ½’ has emerged. A further such example is 
the UNSC’s establishment of UN transitional administrations in East Timor, Kosovo 
and eastern parts of Croatia. A UN administration would constitute an ‘appropriate 
procedure or method of adjustment’ which the Council could recommend under 
article 36.390 Likewise, under Chapter VII, article 41 allows a broad range of different 
                                                 
386 Luck (n 378), 31. 
387 So-called second generation peacekeeping, for example, ‘verification’ missions in 
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measures. The establishment of a UN administration certainly qualifies as a ‘measure 
not involving the use of armed force’ in the sense of this provision.391 
As the WPS agenda evolves, there is evidence of WPS resolutions trying to engage 
broader recommendatory and enforcement functions and powers of the UNSC. For 
example, Resolution 2106 (2013) additionally emphasized the importance of 
addressing sexual violence in armed conflict, in mediation efforts, ceasefires and 
peace agreements.392 Further, in Resolution 2122 (2013), the Council invited United 
Nations-established Commissions of Inquiry investigating situations on the Council’s 
agenda to include in their briefings information on the differentiated impacts of armed 
conflict on women and girls. Resolution 2242 addresses the activities of the Council’s 
Counter-Terrorism Committee. There is less evidence, however, of this dynamic in 
reverse. The Council’s invocation of the WPS resolutions when recommending 
peaceful settlement of disputes, establishing Commissions of Inquiry or peacekeeping 
missions and imposing sanctions is uncommon and irregular.393 
The WPS resolutions give rise to a series of specific monitoring procedures 
concerning related activities by the Council, the UN system and UN member states. 
The UNSC does not act as a monitoring body on state-level implementation of its 
                                                 
391 Ibid, 685. 
392 UNSC Resolution 2106 (2013), paragraph 12. 
393  See, for example, the discussion of peacekeeping in United Nations. (2015). 
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resolutions or thematic issues, as it lacks a mandate, function and means for holding 
member states accountable to its resolutions.394 The UNSC instead requests that the 
UN Secretary-General update the Council on implementation of the WPS resolutions 
through thematic annual reports.395 Important to note is that, while these reports are 
compiled on the basis of information provided by member states on their 
implementation of the resolutions, state submissions to the reporting process are to the 
UN Secretary-General (not the UNSC) and cooperation with reporting is not 
mandatory on states. The reports are important informative outputs and offer 
significant observations on progress towards implementation. They are not, however, 
a modality through which member states are directly accounting to the UNSC for 
implementation of the resolutions.  
Further, under article 29 of the Charter, the UNSC can empower subsidiary organs to 
advance monitoring and supervision on thematic and country-specific issues. (This 
article 29 authority, aligned to Chapter VII enforcement powers, underpinned the 
Council’s establishment of the ICTY and ICTR.396) Among the subsidiary bodies 
established by the Council, some are devoted to overseeing various country-specific 
regimes, such as sanctions.397 (Other working groups are focused on generic questions 
such as sanctions, peacekeeping, conflict prevention and resolution in Africa, children 
                                                 
394 See further O’Rourke and Swaine (n 307). 
395 UNSC Resolution 1325 (2000), paragraphs 16-17.  
396 UNSC Resolution 955 (1994) establishing the ICTR and UNSC Resolution 827 
(1993) establishing the ICTY. 
397 For overview, see https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/.  
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and armed conflict, counter-terrorism and Council procedures.) In respect of so-called 
‘thematic issues’ that have emerged as part of the UNSC activities, a Working Group 
has been established by the Council only on the theme of Children and Armed 
Conflict.398 To date, the UNSC has not shown any appetite for pursuing the option of 
creating a specific body, such as a working group, to advance accountability by 
member states for the WPS agenda.  
Engagement by the UNSC on the issue of sexual violence in armed conflict has been 
accompanied by more robust implementation measures, but focusing on the UN 
system – as distinct from member states – activities. Resolution 1820 (2008), which 
formally introduced sexual violence in armed conflict as a defining issue of WPS, was 
quickly followed by Resolution 1888 (2009), which established mechanisms for the 
earlier resolutions’ implementation and enforcement. Such mechanisms included the 
appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary General to advance the 
UN’s work on addressing sexual violence in armed conflict,399 as well as an annual 
thematic report from the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Sexual 
Violence in Armed Conflict400 distinct from his report on WPS. Importantly, as noted, 
resolution 1960 (2010) established a monitoring, analysis and reporting framework 
(MARA) to document and tracks patterns of conflict-related sexual violence. 401 
Resolution 1960 was also significant for establishing the ‘listing’ procedure whereby 
                                                 
398 Established by UNSC Resolution 1612 (2005). 
399 UNSC Resolution 1888 (2009), paragraph 4. 
400 UNSC Resolution 1820 (2008), paragraph 15.  
401 UNSC Resolution 1960 (2010), paragraphs 6, 8.  
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the Secretary-General was requested to, in the annex to his annual thematic reports, 
‘list’ perpetrators of sexual violence in armed conflict. 402 This ‘listing’ procedure 
however is explicitly confined to situations on the agenda of the UNSC and is 
intended to inform, inter alia, relevant sanctions regimes.403  
The UNSC’s power to enact sanctions is a distinct strength of the UNSC. While the 
General Assembly holds broad powers to make recommendations for actions relating 
to peace and security,404 it concedes authority on measures of enforcement on these 
matters to the UNSC.405 The use of mandatory sanctions is intended to apply pressure 
on a State or entity to comply with the objectives set by the UNSC without resorting 
to the use of force. The Council has resorted to mandatory sanctions as an 
                                                 
402 UNSC Resolution 1960 (2010), paragraphs 3. 
403 UNSC Resolution 1960 (2010), paragraph 3: 
…and to list in an annex to these annual reports the parties that are credibly 
suspected of committing or being responsible for patterns of rape and other 
forms of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict on the Security 
Council agenda; expresses  its intention to use this list as a basis for more 
focused United Nations engagement with those parties, including, as 
appropriate, measures in accordance with the procedures of the relevant 
sanctions committees; 
404 UN Charter (n 69), articles 10, 11 and 12. 
405 Beyerlin, U. (1995). The United Nations Sanctions Regime. In R. Wolfrun and C. 
Philipp (eds), United Nations: Law, Policies and Practice, Volume 2, (pp.1113). 
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
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enforcement tool when peace has been threatened and diplomatic efforts have failed. 
The range of sanctions has included comprehensive economic and trade sanctions 
and/or more targeted measures such as arms embargoes, travel bans, financial or 
diplomatic restrictions.406 Since the end of the Cold War, enforcement action under 
article 41 has become a common instrument of peace maintenance. The link between 
the WPS agenda and the sanctions committee was first made in resolution 1820 
(2008) and reiterated in resolutions 1888 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013) and 2242 
(2015).407 The UNSC created a formal role for the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict who regularly briefs the sanctions 
committee. The mandate of the Special Representative extends to naming and 
proposing individuals or entities to be sanctioned by the UNSC.408  
To date, the UNSC has included sexual violence as a criterion in over half of its 
sanctions regimes.409 Sanctions regimes are only invoked, however, where there is a 
distinct threat to the peace and where other measures have failed. It is thereby 
                                                 
406 See further https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/. 
407  For full discussion, see Security Council Report. (2013). Women, Peace and 
Security: Sexual Violence in Conflict and Sanctions. New York. 
408 UNSC Resolution 1960 (2010), paragraphs 3, 7, 8; UN Office of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict. (2011). 
Provisional Guidance Note: Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1920 
(2010) on Women, Peace and Security (conflict-related sexual violence). Stop Rape 
Now Campaign, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4e23ed5d2.html. 
409 Security Council Report (n 407), 71.  
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distinctly and solely tied to the UNSC’s definition of ‘sexual violence, when used or 
commissioned as a tactic of war’, and to the small number of country situations on the 
agenda of the UNSC. 410   While this offers significant progress in respect to 
enforcement of standards of protection of women’s rights, the potential to use 
sanctions to enforce decisions of the UNSC regarding WPS are thereby restricted to 
situations that reach a certain threshold and are on the agenda of the UNSC.411 
IHL 
ICRC • Humanitarian assistance 
• Protection: monitoring compliance by belligerent 
actors, including direct representation to weapons 
bearers and prison visits 
• Promotion: educating belligerent actors in IHL 
obligations and implementation 
Third party states ‘Protecting powers’ 
                                                 
410 See, for example, UNSC Resolution 2262 (2016) on the situation in the Central 
African Republic. 
411 Attempts to broaden these criteria have been rebutted by some permanent and 
non-permanent member states. See, for example, ‘Statement by Russia’, UN Security 
Council Meeting Record S/PV.6948 (17 April 2013). For broader analysis, see 





International supervisory organ to verify IHL violations 
ICL 
ICC Decision to proceed to investigation 
Trials 
OTP Preliminary examinations 
Investigations 
Prosecutions 
Ad hoc or hybrid 
tribunals 
Limited temporal and geographical jurisdiction for 
prosecution of international crimes established by or with 
UNSC resolution  
IHRL 
Treaty-based Periodic reporting 
‘Monitoring plus’: statements and requests for exceptional 
reports 
Individual complaints 
Inquiries into grave or systematic violations 




• Special Rapporteurs 
• Working Groups 
• Commissions of Inquiry  
• Fact-finding Missions 
Universal Periodic Review 
UNSC 
UN Security Council Chapter VI 
• Recommend pacific measures for the settlement of 
disputes, e.g. negotiation, fact-finding, mediation, 




• Use of Force 
Establish subsidiary organs for the performance of its 
functions, e.g. ad hoc tribunals, sanctions committees, 
Commissions of Inquiry, working groups 
Annual Thematic Reporting 
• Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Framework 
(MARA) for conflict-related sexual violence 
• Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) 
documenting grave violations of children’s rights 
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in armed conflict, including child soldier 
recruitment and sexual violence 
• ‘Listing’ of perpetrators 
Table 1. Monitoring Bodies and Enforcement Procedures for Women’s Rights in 
Conflict under International Law  
 
Conclusion 
The fragmentation of international law presents analytical challenges for studying the 
regulation of women’s rights in conflict. It is increasingly difficult to fully appreciate 
the ways in which international law sets and enforces rules, and provides 
accountability and redress, for violations of women’s rights in conflict. The book’s 
premise is that prevailing analysis of women’s rights in conflict under international 
law unduly consider individual regimes in isolation from one another, when they are 
more appropriately analysed in their interaction with one another. This chapter set out 
to improve analytical clarity, by providing a functional account of how the respective 
regimes differ along key lines. It is clear that the regimes offer different strengths and 
weaknesses in the regulation and protection of women’s rights in conflict. This is an 
important factor in the book’s overall argument that women’s rights in conflict are 
best pursued through productive synergies, interactions and reinforcements across the 
regimes of international law. Regime interdependencies and interaction in the 
regulation of women’s rights are identified and discussed in the next chapter.  
 
